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ABSTRACT
The Australian Employment Covenant (AEC) was launched on 30 October 2008 with the bold goal of creating 
50,000 new jobs for Indigenous Australians within two years. At the end of this ambitious timeframe, the 
scheme has succeeded in securing more than 20,000 job pledges from employers. This is a commendable 
achievement, but estimates put the number of Indigenous job placements under the scheme at around 2,800, 
clearly well short of the original goal. The AEC has publicly backed away from its initial two-year timeframe 
and there has been some recent suggestion that its original target referred only to 50,000 job pledges. 
However, this is at best confusing, with public documents stating that the goals of the AEC initiative included 
the ‘placement of 50,000 Indigenous people into work’ (AEC n.d.-a). This paper examines the nature of the 
AEC and its relationship with government as well as exploring why the rate of actual job creation might have 
been much lower than anticipated. It first sets out the scale of the challenge entailed in creating 50,000 
new jobs for Indigenous Australians, with data suggesting that this was always an impossibly ambitious 
goal. It then examines outcomes in three areas: the number of jobs pledged; estimates of the number of job 
placements; and estimates of retention rates to 26 weeks. A key point to note is that available evidence has 
been very limited, making any assessment of the efficiency of government spending impossible and raising 
important questions about accountability and transparency in the expenditure of public funds. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of some of the factors likely to be constraining Indigenous labour supply. It argues 
that while the AEC may add value to existing employment programs—particularly by securing increased 
employer demand for Indigenous workers—a more flexible approach to employment services might prove 
more effective in increasing sustainable employment outcomes among Indigenous people.
Keywords: Australian Employment Covenant, Indigenous employment, cultural dissonance, accountability
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. On 30 October 2008, then prime minister Kevin Rudd and Andrew Forrest, CEO of Fortescue Metals 
Group, launched the Australian Employment Covenant (AEC) with the goal of creating 50,000 jobs 
for Indigenous Australians within two years (DEEWR 2008). While the two-year timeframe has since 
been removed, this paper seeks to identify the structure and activities of the AEC and provide a 
timely review of its progress in meeting its stated goals. 
2. Some recent reports suggest that the aim of the AEC is to secure ‘the commitment of 50,000 jobs for 
Indigenous Australians’ (see for example BCA 2010: 27, our emphasis). However, the wording of the 
formal agreement between the AEC and the Commonwealth Government identifies that the original 
aims included an aspiration to ‘secure 50,000 sustainable jobs filled by Indigenous Australians’ 
(AEC 2008b: 1, our emphasis). Similarly, the AEC website lists the scheme’s goals as including the 
‘placement of 50,000 Indigenous people into work’ (AEC no date-a). If the original goal of the AEC 
related only to job pledges from employers, then these statements are at best confusing.
3. Indigenous Australians have much higher rates of unemployment than other Australians. They are 
also more likely than other Australians to be long-term unemployed or discouraged workers. If the 
aim of programs like the AEC is to alleviate Indigenous economic and social marginalisation, then 
increasing the Indigenous labour force participation rate and improving employment outcomes for 
the Indigenous long-term unemployed should be priority goals.
4. However, Indigenous labour force data suggest that a target of 50,000 jobs in two years was always 
impossibly ambitious, with only around 22,000 Indigenous jobs created in the five years to the last 
census (SCRGSP 2009). This was a period of strong job creation and economic growth. 
5. The AEC works on a tripartite framework in which employers reserve a specified number of jobs for 
Indigenous employees (these are ‘Covenant Jobs’); Indigenous people agree to commit to one of 
these jobs; and the federal government provides pre-employment training tailored to the specific 
requirements of the employer (AEC 2008b; DEEWR 2008). This training is delivered under existing 
mechanisms, especially the Indigenous Employment Program (IEP). To this extent, the AEC operates 
largely to increase employer demand for Indigenous workers and refer interested employers to 
existing training schemes and providers.
6. The AEC has been very effective in securing job pledges. At the time of writing, more than 20,000 jobs 
have been pledged under the scheme. These jobs are spread across 135 employers and 15 industries 
(AEC no date-a). There is some recent evidence that the AEC may be contributing to a broader trend 
towards increased corporate commitment to Indigenous employment and engagement strategies 
(BCA 2010).
7. Employers who sign up to the AEC are asked to informally ‘guarantee’ jobs to Indigenous applicants 
who successfully complete appropriate training. This creates an incentive for Indigenous job-seekers 
to undertake the required training and seeks to avoid the well-established problem of encouraging 
training simply for training’s sake.
8. Not all of the jobs pledged under the scheme have yet translated into available positions. In signing 
up to the AEC, employers guarantee that a certain number of jobs will be made available for AEC 
participants as vacancies arise in the normal course of business. At the time of writing, it is difficult 
to discern from publicly available data how many jobs are currently available, but it appears there are 
in the order of 350 (AEC 2010).
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9. The job guarantee is an informal one and, unless the employer specifies that the advertised job 
is only open to Indigenous applicants, we understand that it operates in effect somewhat like an 
affirmative action scheme. That is, all suitable applicants may be considered, but if there are two 
or more applicants and one is from the target group, the latter applicant will usually be preferred 
(M. James, pers. comm., 2 September 2010). The effect of this arrangement is that unless AEC jobs 
are quickly filled by Indigenous job-seekers they may be taken by other applicants. While this should 
mean that the number of AEC jobs pledged by the employer rolls over into some future recruitment 
period, it also means that the number of jobs promised might not ever translate into this many 
jobs for Indigenous Australians. While this is not necessarily a flaw in the scheme, it does suggest 
that quoting the number of job pledges as evidence of the AEC’s success in improving Indigenous 
employment prospects is somewhat misleading.
10. Assessment of the AEC’s success should also include the number of job commencements and retention 
rates under the scheme. Unfortunately, the AEC has not yet been able to collect accurate data on 
these outcomes. However, their estimates are that around 2,800 Indigenous people have been placed 
into AEC jobs to date (M. O’Sullivan, pers. comm., 27 October 2010). This figure is clearly well short 
of the stated goal of placing 50,000 Indigenous people into work. If the estimate is accurate it may 
nonetheless be a significant outcome, but whether this is the case is impossible to determine without 
additional information. Any reliable assessment requires data on retention rates (to 26 weeks as well 
as beyond) and would need to control for substitution effects and selection biases. 
11. Substitution effects mean that in order to understand the effects of the program on actual job 
creation, one must know whether the successful job placement and retention of one individual 
has come at the expense of another (Hunter, Gray & Chapman 2000: 14). They are important in 
understanding the impact of the AEC, because several AEC employers also have Reconciliation Action 
Plans. Under these plans employers may have already committed to Indigenous employment targets, 
so it is impossible to know whether a position they have offered under the AEC would have been 
filled by an Indigenous job-seeker anyway. The issue here is not the outcome: increased Indigenous 
employment can be judged a positive outcome regardless of which scheme is responsible. Rather, it 
is a technical question of isolating the effects of the AEC in order to accurately assess its additional 
contribution. Similarly, to understand the job placement outcomes of the AEC, its effects would have 
to be separated out from the parallel activities of Job Services Australia providers and the IEP.  
12. Selection bias refers to the probability that the number of job placements a program achieves 
indicates, at least in part, the self-selection of the least disadvantaged job-seekers (see DEWR 
2002: 3; Hunter, Gray & Chapman 2000: x). Self-selection biases are important in understanding 
the net effects of employment programs because they increase the likelihood that outcomes will be 
skewed upward by those who may have found employment without intensive assistance.
13. Assessing the effectiveness of the AEC requires attention not only to the ‘value added’ of the scheme 
but also to the ‘value for money’ of public investment in it. To the best of our knowledge, the full details 
of this investment have not been made public. This raises important questions about transparency 
and accountability in the expenditure of taxpayer funds. The Commonwealth Government has 
committed at least $4 million to the AEC, including start-up funding and a ‘long-term funding model 
based on the achievement of outcomes’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2010b: 8), but it is not clear 
whether this is the total amount of funding committed or a proportion of it. Outcome payments can 
be made to the AEC on the basis of job pledges, job placements and employee retention to 26 weeks. 
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According to AEC National Manager Matthew O’Sullivan (pers. comm., 27 October 2010), to date the 
AEC has not claimed outcome payments for job placements or retention because their own data on 
these outcomes are inadequate for this purpose. It has received outcome payments for job pledges.
14. The reasons why Indigenous employment rates are comparatively low are well-established and very 
complex. They include structural disadvantages such as the history of marginalisation, exclusion 
from mainstream institutions and under-resourcing of essential services (Altman 2006). For some 
Indigenous people, limited English literacy and numeracy and the lack of experience in holding a 
regular job can put employment even in low-skilled occupations out of reach. These problems are 
recognised by the AEC (see BCA 2010: 27).
15. However, neither the AEC nor the Commonwealth Government have adequately acknowledged the 
potential impact of valid cultural considerations on Indigenous employment needs. Among some 
Indigenous Australians the ‘normative logic’ of a sequenced pathway from the individual pursuit of 
educational credentials to entry into paid employment is a relatively new notion (Kral 2010: 1). It may 
be at odds with socio-cultural systems in which value and meaning derive from kin-based obligations 
that may take precedence over work commitments. Efforts to force change in such cultural constructs 
will at best be slow and require much more intensive investment than short-term pre-employment 
training or post-employment mentoring. At worst, they may undermine highly valued socio-cultural 
forms and social cohesion.
16. Until more detailed information is released about the AEC’s outcomes and its agreements with 
government, it is not possible to assess how well taxpayer dollars are translating into sustainable jobs 
under the scheme. After two years greater public disclosure about the program is in all our interests.
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INTRODUCTION
Two years ago, then prime minister Kevin Rudd and Andrew Forrest, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Fortescue Metals Group, launched the Australian Employment Covenant (AEC) with the bold goal of 
creating 50,000 jobs for Indigenous Australians within two years (Department of Education, Employment 
and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) 2008). At the end of this ambitious timeframe, the covenant—launched 
on 30 October 2008—has succeeded in securing more than 20,000 job promises from 135 employers 
across 15 industries (AEC n.d.-a). Arguably, this demonstrates an impressive amount of corporate 
goodwill, particularly since the early phase of the project occurred at a time of significant macroeconomic 
uncertainty. As will be discussed below, however, the initiative has faced complex challenges, and so far 
has only succeeded in placing an estimated 2,800 Indigenous people into jobs.1 The retention rate for 
these job placements is not yet known. The AEC has now publicly backed away from its initial two-year 
timeframe.2 Nonetheless, there are important questions about why—given the apparent enthusiasm of 
prospective employers—the level of actual job creation under the scheme has been so comparatively low.
There is little dispute that increasing the number of Indigenous people in appropriate paid work is a 
desirable social and policy goal. Available data consistently show that Indigenous Australians have much 
lower rates of employment participation and much higher rates of unemployment than other Australians 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2010; Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service 
Provision (SCRGSP) 2009). Successive federal governments have placed great emphasis on addressing 
this disparity, with the current commitment clearly articulated in the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) framework for ‘Closing the Gap’ on Indigenous disadvantage. One of the six Closing the Gap 
targets is halving the gap in employment outcomes between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians 
within a decade (COAG 2008).
To reach this target at least an additional 100,000 Indigenous Australians will need to find and keep paid 
work by 2018 (Biddle, Taylor & Yap 2008; Commonwealth of Australia 2009b). The most recent census 
data (SCRGSP 2009) put the total number of Indigenous Australians with jobs at around 122,000 (and the 
number of unemployed at approximately 23,000), so getting an additional 100,000 Indigenous people into 
paid work is clearly a major challenge. This is particularly apparent since in the five years to 2006—a period 
of strong job creation and economic growth—the number of Indigenous workers increased by only around 
22,000.3 Even if this substantial growth in Indigenous employment were to continue over the next decade 
it would fall well short of the government’s stated aims (see also Altman, Biddle & Hunter 2008; Hunter 
2009). Moreover, recent estimates suggest that the post-census years have actually seen a deterioration 
in Indigenous employment outcomes, with a significant increase in the number of Indigenous Australians 
who are unemployed (ABS 2010; Altman & Biddle 2010).
In this difficult environment of relatively poor employment outcomes, the AEC’s stated goal of getting 
50,000 more Indigenous Australians into paid work within two years may have seemed particularly 
attractive to its government backers. Certainly, Kevin Rudd’s support for it was in keeping with his 
government’s emphasis on involving the corporate sector in reaching Indigenous employment targets. The 
2009–10 federal budget detailed funding for a ‘Business Action Agenda’ to further engage the corporate 
and not-for-profit sectors in addressing Indigenous disadvantage (Commonwealth of Australia 2009a). 
In both of its annual ‘report cards’ on closing the gaps—released in February 2009 and a year later in 
2010—the government has not only made it clear that it is relying on private sector initiatives to help 
improve Indigenous employment outcomes, but has also highlighted the AEC as one important venture in 
this regard (Commonwealth of Australia 2009b, 2010b). In the lead-up to the recent federal election, the 
AEC: 
Australian 
Employment 
Covenant
DEEWR: 
Department 
of Education, 
Employment 
and Workplace 
Relations
ABS: 
Australian Bureau 
of Statistics
SCRGSP: 
Steering Committee 
for the Review 
of Government 
Service Provision
COAG: 
Council of 
Australian 
Governments
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Coalition also identified its support for the AEC, stating that if it were elected into government it would 
inject substantial new funds into the scheme and even extend it to some non-Indigenous job-seekers4 
(Liberal Party of Australia 2010a: 8, 2010b: 6).
This paper seeks to do three things. First, it reflects briefly on available data to illustrate the scale of the 
challenge involved in attempting to create 50,000 new Indigenous jobs. It then details the structure and 
activities of the AEC and provides a timely review of its progress in meeting its stated goals. Key outcomes 
explored include the number and nature of job pledges, rates of job placement and retention, relations 
with government and the transparency of AEC funding, achievements and processes. Lastly, the paper 
explores the complex challenges faced by the AEC, drawing on long-standing debates about Indigenous 
disadvantage, aspirations, and the appropriate legislative and policy response.
THE EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGE
Efforts to improve Indigenous employment outcomes are often framed as tackling Indigenous 
unemployment. That the challenge rests on unemployment rates may seem like common sense, but 
data indicate that while a large proportion of Indigenous Australians are unemployed, many more are 
outside the labour force (that is, not employed and not formally looking for work). Hence, as this section 
shows, getting 50,000 more Indigenous people into paid work is likely to require both decreasing the 
rate of Indigenous unemployment (getting more people to move from unemployment into paid jobs) 
and increasing the Indigenous labour force participation rate (getting those not looking for work to 
do so). The differences between the unemployed and those outside the labour force are discussed in more 
detail below.
INDIGENOUS UNEMPLOYMENT
The Indigenous unemployment rate5 declined in the years of rapid economic growth prior to the last census 
but, as noted above, appears to have increased again since that time. It remains considerably higher than 
the rate for the non-Indigenous population. To take the best case scenario for Indigenous employment 
prospects, this section focuses largely on census data for 2001 and 2006 (when Indigenous employment 
outcomes improved more than in any other recorded period). Some attention is also given to the more 
recent estimates of Indigenous labour force status produced by the ABS, and the policy implications of 
this apparent turn in fortunes since the last census.
It should be noted at the outset that any discussion of Indigenous employment and unemployment statistics 
faces the immediate problem of data quality. As should already be apparent there are two primary sources 
of data with which to assess employment trends: the five-yearly Census of Population and Housing (the 
census); and the usually annual Labour Force Survey (LFS), both of which are produced by the ABS.6 
Because of methodological differences, the two data sets cannot be compared. More importantly, each of 
them has significant limitations in reliability. This poses an enormous problem for policy frameworks such 
as the COAG ‘Closing the Gap’ approach which, to be meaningful, requires clear benchmarks and a reliable 
way of measuring both absolute and relative changes over time.7
To briefly summarise what are quite complex issues, the LFS is used for official estimates of labour 
force status and has an advantage over the census in that the latter tends to undercount the number of 
Indigenous Australians.8 The LFS reduces this problem by ignoring incomplete surveys and then adjusting 
the data to account for non-responses. While the survey only covers a small proportion of the population 
(with just over 3,000 people in the 2009 survey identifying as Indigenous), data are then weighted to 
LFS:
Labour Force 
Survey
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population benchmarks to produce estimates for the entire Indigenous adult population.9 The LFS has a 
second advantage in that the census relies on only four questions to determine labour force status while 
the LFS uses up to 30.10
However, while the ABS acknowledges the problems of undercount in the census, it also notes that the 
Indigenous estimates in the LFS have significant standard errors (due largely to the relatively small sample 
size) and may not be reliable for remote areas.11 In addition, Indigenous estimates from the LFS are not 
suitable for direct comparisons to non-Indigenous data.12 Census data allow a more reliable comparison 
across Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations and are therefore useful in assessing changes in the 
disparities between the two groups. For these reasons, the discussion here focuses largely on census data. 
Readers should bear in mind, though, that the figures presented remain subject to limitations.13 More 
detail about data quality, including a comparison of census and LFS data, is provided in Appendix 1.
Census data show that between 2001 and 2006 the number of Indigenous people who were unemployed 
decreased from around 25,000 to 22,500 (Table 1). Since the number of Indigenous people with paid 
jobs increased substantially at the same time (according to the census, by around 22,000 people), 
this corresponds to a notable decline in the Indigenous unemployment rate—from 20.0 per cent to 
15.6 per cent. However, while the gap between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous unemployment rates 
closed slightly in the period, by 2006 Indigenous Australians were still more than three times as likely to 
be unemployed as the rest of the Australian population.
The most recent Indigenous labour force data available suggest that the situation may have deteriorated 
since the 2006 census. To some extent this is not surprising, given that the census was taken during 
a period of substantial economic growth and the macroeconomic climate subsequently became much 
more uncertain. In periods of macroeconomic downturn, job applicants with comparatively low skills have 
to compete with a bigger pool of job-seekers—including those with much stronger formal qualifications—
than would usually be the case. They may also fall victim to ‘Last In, First Out’ accounting, in which low-
skilled employees who were the last to be hired during a period of economic growth are then the first to 
be shed when the business cycle turns (Hunter 2009: 8–9).
According to the LFS, the unemployment rate among Indigenous people of working age grew from 
13.8 per cent in 2006 to 18.1 per cent in 2009 (ABS 2010: 16).14 This is a significant increase (that is, even 
when standard errors are taken into account).15 A breakdown of Indigenous labour force status by State/
Territory lends some support to the notion that the global financial crisis contributed to this change. 
For example, between 2008 and 2009 by far the biggest increase in Indigenous unemployment rates was 
in Western Australia and Queensland (ABS 2010: 17). These two States are the most dependent on the 
Unemployed ’000 Unemployment rate (%) Gap in unemployment rate (%)
Indigenous
Non-
Indigenous Indigenous
Non-
Indigenous Indigenous minus non-Indigenous
2001 24.9 628.8 20.0 7.3 12.7
2006 22.5 471.2 15.6 5.1 10.5
Note: Based on usual place of residence.
Source: Census data, derived from SCRGSP 2009.
Table 1. Unemployment rates and levels, Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians aged 15–64 years, 2001 and 2006
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resources sector, which was heavily hit during the financial crisis by falling prices and demand. According 
to news reports, by mid-2009 more than 5,000 mining jobs had been lost in Queensland (McCarthy 2009) 
and around 20,000 lost in Western Australia (Wright 2010).
It is not possible to be definitive about the relative contributions of the economic crisis and other factors 
like policy decisions on worsening Indigenous unemployment outcomes. For example, it is not clear how 
many of the mining jobs lost in Queensland or Western Australia, or those in ancillary industries, had been 
held by Indigenous workers. And it is likely that the higher Indigenous unemployment rate reflects, at 
least in part, recent policy changes such as the winding back of the Community Development Employment 
Projects (CDEP) scheme (see Altman & Biddle 2010). It will be up to future data collections to identify 
whether Indigenous unemployment rates return to pre-crisis trajectories as the economy returns to 
stronger economic growth.
LONG TERM UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT
Among the unemployed, Indigenous people are more likely than other Australians to be long-term 
unemployed, where this is defined as having been unemployed for 12 months or more. In 2004–05, around 
4.7 per cent of the total Indigenous labour force was in this category. This was much higher than the 
equivalent non-Indigenous rate of 0.9 per cent. As a proportion of the total unemployed, Indigenous 
long-term unemployment reached as high as 41.6 per cent, which compares to only 27.4 per cent for the 
non-Indigenous unemployed16 (SCRGSP 2009: 4.67–4.68).
The long-term unemployed tend to have lower levels of formal education and lower skills than others in 
the labour market, and by definition are excluded from work experience for long periods. This can have 
serious implications for future employment prospects, with the long-term unemployed often overlooked 
by potential employers (Chapman & Kapuscinski 2000) and remaining only tenuously attached to the 
labour market over time (Dockery & Webster 2001).17 Because long-term unemployment is sometimes 
associated with reduced mental and physical health and increased financial stress and social isolation 
(McClelland 1993), it is a feature of the labour market that warrants particular concern.18 If the aim of 
programs like the AEC is to alleviate Indigenous economic and social marginalisation, then improving 
employment outcomes for the Indigenous long-term unemployed should be a priority goal.
As well as having higher rates of unemployment and long-term unemployment, Indigenous Australians 
are overrepresented among the underemployed. Underemployment refers broadly to the underutilisation 
of labour. In this paper it is understood to include workers who are employed for fewer hours than they 
would like to work (involuntary part-time employment), and workers who are employed to undertake 
tasks that require a lower skill level than they possess.19 Addressing these kinds of underemployment is 
not a key concern in the AEC or COAG employment targets (that both relate to getting more Indigenous 
people into jobs). Nonetheless, if the AEC can open up employment opportunities that better utilise 
current Indigenous employees’ skills and work capacities than their present jobs, then reducing Indigenous 
underemployment is a possible outcome.
There is little direct evidence about the current extent of Indigenous underemployment, but some 
inferences can be made from existing data. The 2006 Census showed that Indigenous workers were 
overrepresented among the part-time labour force.20 Among employed Indigenous people of working 
age, 36.6 per cent held part-time jobs, compared to 30.9 per cent of the corresponding non-Indigenous 
group (SCRGSP 2009). The census does not identify the proportion of part-time workers who want to 
work longer hours, but Hunter and Taylor (2002) have used the 1994 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Survey (NATSIS)—the latest year for which appropriate data are publicly available—to show 
that over one-quarter (27.6%) of Indigenous workers at that time would have preferred more hours of 
CDEP:
Community 
Development 
Employment 
Projects
NATSIS:
National Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait 
Islander Survey
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work. They noted that underemployment was less prevalent among the non-Indigenous workforce. This is 
supported by ABS data that—while not strictly comparable—show that in July 1994 around 6.3 per cent 
of the total Australian workforce were working part-time but wanted to work more hours (ABS 1994).21
One factor contributing to the overrepresentation of Indigenous people among the underemployed at that 
time may have been Indigenous participation in the (usually part-time) CDEP scheme. The 1994 NATSIS 
showed that Indigenous workers in CDEP positions were twice as likely as other Indigenous employees 
to be working fewer hours than they would like (50.0% compared to 19.7%) (Hunter 2002). This does 
not suggest that part-time hours are necessarily antithetical to Indigenous interests. Indeed, for some 
Indigenous people part-time hours allow the flexibility to participate in other forms of activity—such 
as hunting, fishing and ceremony—that contribute to livelihood, cultural maintenance and personal 
empowerment (Altman, Buchanan & Biddle 2006; Hunter & Taylor 2002). It needs to also be noted that, 
according to 2002 data, most CDEP participants have worked more than the required minimum hours per 
week, including many who have worked full-time (Altman, Gray & Levitus 2005: 11). Moreover, in many 
cases—particularly in remote areas—part-time work under the CDEP scheme may be the only viable 
alternative to unemployment.
A further concern here is that survey respondents who say they would like to work more hours may be 
unable or unwilling to commit to those extra hours in practice, particularly when faced with alternative 
demands on their time. To paraphrase anthropologist Marvin Harris (1971: 149), there is no error more 
common or devastating than to confuse what people say, wish, dream, and believe they would do with 
what they would actually do. Nonetheless, the available evidence does point to high rates of Indigenous 
underemployment and financial insecurity, with peoples’ stated desire to work additional hours likely 
reflecting—at least in part—a desire for greater income (Hunter 2002).22
While the above discussion points to inadequate data on involuntary part-time employment among 
Indigenous people, there is even less available evidence about the level of utilisation of Indigenous workers’ 
skills. One exception is a qualitative study of career aspirations among young Torres Strait Islanders (Arthur 
& David-Petero 2000), in which interview participants identified much of the work carried out under CDEP 
schemes—the main source of employment on most islands in the Torres Strait—as boring and relatively 
meaningless. Clearly, this is not a definitive indicator of skills utilisation, but it is arguably a reasonable 
proxy indicator for work that fails to challenge employees by putting their skills to best use. There are two 
reasons, though, for not reading too much into this finding. First, the study is by no means representative 
of all CDEP participants. Second, it should be noted that interview participants identified some types of 
CDEP activities as more rewarding, with full-time employment, traineeships and apprenticeships that had 
been created within the scheme all being locally valued.
It is not possible to ascertain how Indigenous underemployment rates have changed in recent years 
because up-to-date data do not exist. However, a likely outcome is that rates have declined somewhat, at 
least until the recent economic downturn. This inference is made on the basis of census data that show 
that the proportion of Indigenous employees who worked full-time in the private sector increased in the 
five years to 2006, as did the proportion of Indigenous workers in high-skilled and well-paid occupations 
(Biddle, Taylor & Yap 2008: 22, 28). Participation in the CDEP scheme has also declined markedly, although 
it is far from clear whether the majority of former participants have secured alternative, let alone full-
time, employment.
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LABOUR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION
While unemployment and underemployment are key indicators of labour market outcomes, getting 
50,000 more Indigenous people into paid work will rely not only on reducing unemployment, but also 
on increasing Indigenous participation in the labour force. This is clearly demonstrated in Table 2, which 
shows that at the time of the 2006 Census the pool of Indigenous unemployed was only around 23,000 
people. At the same time, the pool of Indigenous people of working age who were outside the labour force 
(that is, neither working nor seeking work) was over four times as large, at around 109,000 people.23
Table 2 also shows that the proportion of Indigenous people of working-age who participate in the labour 
force (the ‘labour force participation rate’) increased in the last intercensal period (from 54.1 to 56.8%). 
However, by 2006 it remained well below the non-Indigenous rate of 75.5 per cent (SCRGSP 2009).
There are many reasons why Indigenous Australians may be overrepresented among those not in the 
labour force. People outside the labour force include those who are retired, caring for others, prevented 
from working because of a disability, studying full-time and not seeking paid work, or working full-
time outside the mainstream labour market (such as in unpaid child care or domestic work). Indigenous 
Australians are disproportionately represented among those with disabilities and chronic disease, and are 
overrepresented among those on the disability support pension (SCRGSP 2009).24 ABS data also indicate 
that Indigenous people are overrepresented among those caring for others (such as the frail aged or those 
with disabilities or long-term illnesses), and that carers are less likely to be employed and more likely to be 
outside the labour force than other Australians (Edwards et al. 2009).
It is important to note that being outside the labour force does not necessarily indicate the absence of 
desire to participate in paid work. For example, those not in the labour force also include discouraged 
workers, broadly defined as people who want to work but are not actively looking for jobs (Hunter & Gray 
2001).25 Several studies suggest that Indigenous Australians may be significantly overrepresented among 
discouraged workers. Using data from the mid-1990s, Gray and Hunter (2005) have compared the labour 
market transitions of the Indigenous and non-Indigenous unemployed over a period of 15 months. They 
show that among those out of work at the beginning of the period, Indigenous Australians were much 
more likely than other Australians to have left the labour force (and much less likely to have moved into 
paid work) 15 months on.26 Using a different data set from around the same time, Hunter and Gray (2001) 
have shown that Indigenous Australian men were four times more likely than other Australian men, and 
Indigenous women three times as likely as other women, to be discouraged workers.27
Employed 
’000
Unemployed 
’000
Total labour force 
’000
Not in labour force 
’000
Labour force 
participation rate 
%
2001 99.6 24.9 124.5 105.9 54.1
2006 121.5 22.5 144.1 109.4 56.8
Note: Based on usual place of residence.
Source: Census data, derived from SCRGSP 2009.
Table 2. Labour force status of Indigenous Australians aged 15–64 years, 
2001 and 2006
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Unfortunately, more recent statistical publications for Indigenous Australians do not identify the desire of 
those not in the labour force to participate in paid work, so it is not possible to make definitive statements 
about the current representation of Indigenous people among discouraged workers.28 As noted above, 
there have been considerable changes in Australia’s macroeconomic and policy environments since the 
mid-1990s that would no doubt have influenced individuals’ opportunities and motivations to find work. 
In particular, the prolonged period of substantial economic growth until mid-2008 could be expected to 
have reduced the number of discouraged workers at least until the economic downturn, and it would not 
be surprising if the numbers have subsequently risen.29
The relatively low labour force participation rate of Indigenous Australians even in the ‘peak’ employment 
period up to 200630—as well as locational constraints and ongoing Indigenous disadvantage in levels 
of formal education, training and workplace experience—would be consistent with the continued 
overrepresentation of Indigenous people among discouraged workers. If the AEC is to reach its target 
of getting 50,000 more Indigenous Australians into paid work, increasing the Indigenous labour force 
participation rate—and by implication reducing the numbers of discouraged Indigenous workers—must 
be a priority goal.
THE AUSTRALIAN EMPLOYMENT COVENANT
Billed as creating a pathway from ‘welfare to wellbeing’ (AEC n.d.-c), the AEC is designed to assist 
Indigenous people who are out of work and receiving social security benefits get a job. It promotes 
employment as a way to ensure that Indigenous Australians ‘achieve their full potential as productive 
members of Australian society’ (GenerationOne 2010) and seeks to demonstrate to Indigenous students 
that ‘welfare is not an option’ (AEC n.d.-c: 3). Based on these goals, it can be assumed that the AEC is most 
focused on addressing the problems of unemployment and low labour force participation rates, including 
the tendency of some Indigenous job-seekers to become discouraged workers. In launching the AEC Kevin 
Rudd (2008a) lauded its intentions, arguing that ‘the most basic form of social justice available to any 
person at any time and in any place … is the right to a job.’
This section outlines the structure and design of the AEC. The information provided is derived largely from 
the AEC website and government publications, and while all care has been taken to ensure accuracy, it is 
possible that some aspects of the AEC’s operation have differed from its publicly stated plans. According 
to these sources, though, the AEC operates on a tripartite framework in which employers (whether public, 
private or non-government organisations) reserve a specified number of jobs for Indigenous employees 
(these are ‘Covenant Jobs’); Indigenous people agree to commit to one of these jobs and remain in 
employment for a minimum period of 26 weeks; and the federal government provides pre-employment 
(or ‘Job Set’) training tailored to the specific requirements of the employer (AEC 2008b; DEEWR 2008). 
While the ‘job guarantee’ is not legally binding, the promised job is open to the applicant on the condition 
of completing the training, and as a further measure to assist the transition into work, every Indigenous 
person employed under the scheme is supposed to be paired with a mentor (or workplace ‘Hero’) for at 
least their first 26 weeks of work (AEC n.d.-b, n.d.-d).31
As well as targeting the unemployed, the AEC includes a ‘P Plate’ program that is aimed at Indigenous 
school students. Under this scheme—which will be implemented in 2011—Indigenous students will be 
encouraged to take up work experience and training opportunities so that they are ‘job ready’ upon 
leaving school.32 If they successfully complete their schooling and work-based training, students will be 
informally guaranteed a full time job with an AEC employer (AEC n.d.-a). The tripartite AEC framework is 
illustrated in Fig. 1 and the responsibilities of each actor participating in the program are set out in more 
detail below.
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HOW THE COVENANT WORKS
As an organisation the AEC has several branches, including a national ‘Indigenous engagement team’, 
a ‘business development team’ and an ‘implementation team’. The first of these is responsible for 
communications with Indigenous organisations and individuals to encourage job-seeker participation, 
including in remote areas. The second works with potential AEC employers to secure their involvement. 
Once a business is signed up as an AEC employer, they are handed over to the implementation team to 
facilitate the necessary training and recruitment arrangements (M. James, pers. comm., 2 September 
2010). Overseeing all of these activities is Rhonda Parker as CEO, who has recently taken over this role 
from Malcolm James. Parker has previously been the federal aged care commissioner and a minister in 
the Western Australian Government, while James was formerly executive chairman of Perth-based firm 
Resource and Capital Management (AEC n.d.-a).
The AEC is also overseen by a steering committee—chaired by Noel Pearson—that includes Andrew Forrest 
and prominent Indigenous figures Marcia Langton, Sue Gordon and Warren Mundine. Additional members 
are Sir Rod Eddington and David Bassau. Eddington is chairman of ANZ and a director of the Centre for 
Independent Studies, and also holds non-executive roles with several major firms (including JP Morgan, News 
Corporation and Rio Tinto). Bassau is a proponent of micro finance and micro enterprise development.
Various programs delivered by successive federal governments and non-government organisations have 
long sought to engage the corporate sector in improving Indigenous employment outcomes. Most notably, 
these include the Reconciliation Action Plan (RAP) scheme run through Reconciliation Australia and several 
elements of the Indigenous Employment Policy introduced by the Howard Government. In comparison to 
these programs, though, the AEC has some advantage in being driven by the private sector. For example, 
Fig. 1. The Australian Employment Covenant framework
Source: AEC n.d.-c: 2.
GOVERNMENT AND THE
TRAINING COMMUNITY
50,000 MENTORS
How it works
50,000 JOB ACCEPTANCES
COM
M
ITM
ENT TO EM
PLOY
50
,0
00
 TR
AI
NE
ES
/P
-P
LA
TE
RS
TR
AI
NI
NG
 O
F 5
0,
00
0
COM
M
ITM
ENT TO TRAIN TO EM
PLOYERS’ REQUIREM
ENTS
50,000 JOB OFFERS
50,000 SUSTAINABLE JOBS
WITH MENTOR SUPPORT
50,000 INDIGENOUS
PARTICIPANTS
AUSTRALIAN
EMPLOYERS
RAP:
Reconciliation 
Action Plan
9Working Paper 74/2010
http://caepr.anu.edu.au/
some members of the steering committee and development teams clearly have long-standing links with 
corporate Australia, which one could assume has assisted in establishing the AEC’s corporate networks 
and support.33 In addition, with some having experience as private employers in their own right, they may 
be better tuned to employer needs.34
THE AEC COMMITMENT
Under the terms of the agreement between the federal government and the Employment Covenant 
(the business entity), the latter has agreed to:
• lead and drive the AEC initiative;
• ensure that participating employers provide guarantees of sustainable employment 
for Indigenous job-seekers who have completed pre-employment training to 
employer specifications;
• ensure employers provide post-placement support and mentoring; and
• encourage participating employers to adopt workplace cultures and practices ‘directed 
at improving the recruitment, retention and development of Indigenous participants’ 
(AEC 2008b: 1).
The Employment Covenant has also agreed to advise the federal government ‘on recommendations in 
regards to barriers to sustainable employment for Indigenous Australians’ (AEC 2008b: 2). While such 
advice has not been made available in public documents, Malcolm James has indicated that discussions 
with government occur on a regular basis (M. James, pers. comm., 2 September 2010).
THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT
Unfortunately, the size and nature of the Commonwealth Government’s financial commitment to the 
AEC have not been made publicly available. The contracts were signed just prior to the release of the 
Commonwealth Grant Guidelines that ensure government agencies publicly report all grants awarded. 
The few details that are available in public statements identify that the Commonwealth Government 
initially committed at least $400,000 for the AEC to develop a marketing and communications strategy 
and set up a call centre to take enquiries from interested employers. Commonwealth funding was also made 
available to establish AEC offices and develop the AEC website (M. O’Sullivan, pers. comm., 27 October 
2010), but it is not clear whether this was included in, or additional to, the $400,000. 
The government has also identified that it has committed $4 million to the AEC including start-up funding 
and a ‘long-term funding model based on the achievement of outcomes’ (Commonwealth of Australia 
2010b: 8). To the best of our knowledge, at the time of writing, the full details of this arrangement have 
not been made public. Again, it is not clear whether the original $400,000 is included in this $4 million, or 
indeed whether $4 million is the total financial commitment of the government or just a proportion of it. 
Matthew O’Sullivan (pers. comm., 27 October 2010) has noted that the AEC has a contract with DEEWR 
to support the AEC’s operational costs, with additional funding tied to outcomes achieved in terms of the 
number of job pledges from employers, job placements and retention rates to 26 weeks. The operational 
costs of the AEC are not known to us, but the business entity currently employs around 20 staff. Another 
feature of the Commonwealth Government’s support for the AEC has been the secondment of DEEWR 
staff to AEC State and Territory offices for the 12 months to August 2010 (B. Love, pers. comm., 14 October 
2010). This may reflect Andrew Forrest’s request for ‘a very modest network of state officers to ensure 
the proper flow of information between the AEC, employers, mentors, employees and DEEWR’ (Karvelas 
2009). Additional support from the Commonwealth Government comes via the JobSearch initiative, a 
publicly funded online tool for listing job vacancies and searching for suitable job-seekers.36 AEC jobs are 
tagged on this site so that they can be searched for specifically (DEEWR n.d.-b).
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In addition to operational funding and outcome payments, the Commonwealth Government has committed 
to ‘make resources available’ for pre-employment training and post-placement mentoring and support 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2009b: 27). However, as should become clear, this arrangement relies solely 
on pre-existing employment programs and no additional job-seeker training is provided through the 
AEC. Participating AEC employers are supposed to work with government and the AEC implementation 
team to determine industry-relevant training specifications that are suitable to both skill level and 
geographic location (AEC n.d.-a). In practice, though, there is little difference between the arrangements 
for training under this scheme and the training services already delivered by the federal government 
under the Indigenous Employment Program (IEP). Originally introduced by the Howard Government as the 
Indigenous Employment Policy, the IEP has until recently included two particular schemes of interest here. 
These are the Corporate Leaders for Indigenous Employment Project (CLIEP) and Structured Training and 
Employment Projects (STEP).
Under CLIEP, private sector employers signed a statement in which they made a public commitment to 
employing Indigenous people. A memorandum of understanding and formal contract were subsequently 
developed between each participating company and DEEWR, in which tailored government funding for 
assistance was agreed. Such assistance could include pre-employment training, cross-cultural awareness 
training for existing staff or mentoring for new Indigenous appointments (Department of Employment 
and Workplace Relations (DEWR) 2003: 117). In 2009 the Labor Government announced a review of CLIEP, 
with ‘an announcement on the future of this program [to] be made by the Government in due course’ 
(DEEWR 2010a). It would seem, though, that its role in engaging the corporate sector has been superseded 
by the AEC.
STEP has sought to increase Indigenous employment by offering employers access to publicly-funded 
training packages for Indigenous workers. The training packages have ostensibly been tailored to employer 
needs. Many of the services offered under STEP are now provided under a ‘reformed’ IEP, with employers 
able to choose from tailored assistance for training Indigenous staff or other ‘pre-designed’ packages like 
wage subsidies (DEEWR n.d.-a). It is no accident the training services already offered under the IEP sound 
rather similar to those associated with the AEC. The key functions of the AEC are to secure employer 
demand and then facilitate employers’ utilisation of existing training schemes such as those under the 
IEP (M. O’Sullivan, pers. comm., 21 September 2010).35 This may be delivered through various agencies 
including registered training organisations, vocational education providers such as TAFE colleges, or Job 
Services Australia providers where they facilitate short courses (M. James, pers. comm., 2 September 2010).
EMPLOYER COMMITMENTS
On signing up to participate in the AEC, employers agree to guarantee jobs (previously approved by 
the covenant team) to Indigenous job-seekers who have completed the required training. Employer 
commitments of jobs are supposed to ‘accurately reflect the operational needs of the business’ in that 
job-placements are ‘anticipated to fill opportunities that arise in the normal course of business activity 
and staff turnover’ (AEC n.d.-a). This means that rather than new jobs being created for AEC positions, 
an employer commitment under the AEC guarantees that a specified number of jobs will be available for 
suitably trained Indigenous job-seekers as the need for new workers arises.
As noted above, AEC employers must also commit to assigning a one-on-one mentor to each Indigenous 
job-seeker employed under the program and ensuring that the culture and practices of the workplace 
support the recruitment, development and retention of Indigenous staff. Finally, employers must ensure 
that ‘workplace practices and terms of employment are non-discriminatory of Indigenous employees’ 
(AEC n.d.-a).
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It should be noted that this latter obligation is also enshrined in law under the Racial Discrimination 
Act 1975. The Act does, though, allow for ‘special measures’ under which ‘racial’ distinctions can be made 
to help disadvantaged groups or individuals fully enjoy their rights. For example, the Australian Human 
Rights Commission (n.d.: 4) states that:
Indigenous people in Australia suffer from greater social and economic disadvantage than other 
groups in society. Because of this disadvantage, they may need special assistance to enjoy their 
rights to education, employment, and health to the same level that other Australians enjoy 
those rights.
It should be noted that while employers sign a covenant that specifies they guarantee a certain number 
of jobs to appropriately trained applicants, this is not a legal obligation. The covenant signed between 
the Commonwealth Government and the AEC does specify that participating employers will ‘formally 
guarantee to provide sustainable employment for Indigenous Australians on successful completion of pre-
employment job specific training’ (AEC 2008b: 1). However, in practice, the AEC sees this as an informal 
commitment to positively discriminate in favour of an Indigenous job-seeker if there is more than one 
person of equal skill applying for the job (M. James, pers. comm., 2 September 2010).
EMPLOYEE COMMITMENTS
Prospective job-seekers who wish to take up a Covenant Job are asked to ‘accept the personal responsibility, 
challenge and opportunity to complete training and receive a job’ with a participating employer. They 
must first select an industry of their choice (usually by returning a form to Centrelink), then complete 
the required job training for that industry and, where requested by an employer, commit to stay in their 
post-training job for ‘a minimum of 26 weeks, but preferably on a long term basis’. Finally, they must also 
‘accept the support and guidance’ of their workplace mentor ‘to face and overcome the challenges of 
keeping a permanent job’ (AEC 2008a: 1).
Like the employer guarantee of a job, the employee commitment to remain in employment for 26 weeks is 
not legally binding. The formal wording of the agreement between the Commonwealth Government and 
the Employment Covenant is that Indigenous people participating in the program commit to ‘accept and 
remain in employment once trained’ (AEC 2008b: 1). However, other documents suggest that Indigenous 
participants will simply be ‘encouraged’ to remain in employment once they have been placed in a job 
(AEC n.d.-c: 3). Malcolm James (pers. comm., 2 September 2010) has indicated that when job-seekers sign 
an agreement to remain in employment for 26 weeks it is an informal process designed to demonstrate 
their commitment, and that they would not be penalised for leaving before the end of the period.
MENTORS
Workplace mentors, called ‘Heroes’, volunteer to enter into an informal relationship with an Indigenous 
employee in order to ‘enhance and encourage workplace performance’ and facilitate the employee’s self-
reliance (AEC n.d.-a). Additional, professional mentoring support can also be arranged through the AEC. 
Andrew Forrest has described the need for mentors as follows:
Our task of placing and retaining Indigenous workers in the workforce will not always be an 
easy one. You will be very aware that many employees new to the workforce have a variety of 
challenges they bring with them from unemployment. New workers will need to be supported 
as they adapt to a working life and should be encouraged as they cast off old and unhelpful 
habits. In helping Indigenous workers make the transition to a working life, mentors become the 
real heroes in the fight to overcome Indigenous disadvantage (Forrest, in AEC n.d.-b: 3).
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We return briefly to the wording of this statement later. For now, our focus is on the role of the mentors. 
While they are supported by their employing organisation, mentors can also access support through the 
AEC telephone hotline, mentoring workshops organised by the AEC and online education modules available 
to registered users through the AEC website.37 The two modules are ‘Mentoring’ and ‘Indigenous People 
and Culture’ (AEC n.d.-a). Before beginning their mentoring relationship, mentors are asked to read the 
‘Heroes Handbook’ produced by the AEC (also available online).
The handbook suggests that mentees may need different levels of support, from learning about workplace 
culture and procedures, to help in day-to-day work performance, to balancing the requirements of work, 
community and family. It encourages mentors to undertake cross-cultural awareness training and be 
sensitive to conditions that may impact on work-readiness and performance (such as the impacts of poor 
health on absenteeism, the possibility of low levels of education, and the impact of low life expectancies 
on the number of funerals a person may need to attend). The handbook also encourages prospective 
mentors to find out more about Indigenous Australia through Reconciliation Australia’s ‘Share Our 
Pride’ website (AEC n.d.-b: 15). The issue of whether such schemes are likely to be adequate—both in 
supporting Indigenous workers and addressing any incidence of personal or institutional discrimination in 
the workplace—is returned to briefly later in this paper.
SCHOOLS
Under the AEC’s ‘P Plate’ program that will become fully operational in 2011, participating high schools 
are linked to companies offering work experience or other workplace learning placements. The program 
will initially run in the Northern Territory, Western Australia and Queensland in approximately 100 schools 
that have a minimum quantum of Indigenous students (M. James, pers. comm., 2 September 2010).38 
It involves an agreement between schools, students, parents and the AEC, with schools committing to 
introduce or maintain ‘retention strategies’ for Indigenous students and appointing a mentor (or ‘school 
ambassador’) from among staff to provide ongoing support to participating students. It will be the school’s 
responsibility to select students for the program. Participating students (and their parent or guardian) will 
sign a covenant with the school (AEC n.d.-a).
One aim of the P Plate program is to ensure that school-leavers do not see welfare as an option, so that 
‘each and every child is prepared to make the correct choices once they reach the crucial decision-making 
time at the end of their education and/or training’ (AEC n.d.-a: unpaginated). Again, the wording of this 
statement is noteworthy, and will be returned to later. The AEC anticipates that they can best improve 
employment outcomes for school leavers by engaging with children at young ages. For this reason, P Plate 
participants will be sent into primary schools as ‘role models’ and the AEC will look to developing a suitable 
program for primary schools in future (M. James, pers. comm., 2 September 2010).
EMPLOYMENT SERVICE PROVIDERS
Each AEC employer selects a preferred employment service provider from those available in its location. 
This provider then works to fill all of that employer’s AEC jobs, including liaising with other employment 
service providers if necessary. This system seeks to ensure that providers are focused on identifying 
suitable applicants for a particular job, instead of simply providing a large quantity of referrals. Providers 
are required to give assistance to Indigenous people who want to take up AEC jobs. According to the 
AEC website, there is a clear time restraint imposed: AEC participants must be referred to an AEC job or 
training place within five days of signing an undertaking with the AEC (AEC n.d.-a: unpaginated).
The process through which an employer engages an employment service provider with a view to taking on 
an Indigenous job-seeker is set out in Fig. 2.
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WHAT HAS THE AEC ACHIEVED?
Under the terms of the agreements signed with participating employers, the Employment Covenant 
(the business entity) has agreed to ‘use its best endeavours’ to:
record and publish the outcomes achieved. This will be measured by the number of Indigenous 
participants who complete job-specific training, commence employment with an AEC Employer 
and subsequently remain in full or part-time employment for a minimum of 26 weeks 
(AEC 2008c: 2).
Initial signs were that some of this reporting may happen online, with the AEC website including a page on 
‘Success Stories’. Unfortunately, at the time of writing this article, the page has not been updated since the 
very early days of the AEC, and the only success story it records is the graduation of 11 Indigenous job-
seekers from the first AEC Job Set Training Course in May 2009 (AEC n.d.-a). Indeed, as yet, the AEC has 
not fulfilled its commitment to record and publish employment outcomes achieved, only publicising the 
number of jobs employers have allocated to the scheme. The Commonwealth Government has not been 
any more forthcoming in public documents, usually only citing the number of jobs pledged. For example, 
in February 2010 it noted that:
The AEC has received commitments by Australian employers to hire in excess of 16,000 
Indigenous job-seekers. Work is underway to convert those commitments into sustainable job 
outcomes for Indigenous Australians (Commonwealth of Australia 2010b: 8).
Fig. 2. Employer engagement of a selected employment service provider
Notes:  ESP refers to employment service provider. SESP refers to selected employment service provider. ESPs are selected 
based on availability within the market location, Indigenous case load numbers, employer suitability and previous 
service arrangements.
Source: AEC 2008d.
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The following sections use what little data are available to examine the AEC’s achievements in four 
areas: the number of jobs pledged and made available; the number of Indigenous job-seekers who have 
completed training and found ongoing work under the scheme; relationships with government; and the 
transparency of the AEC process.
JOB PLEDGES
As noted at the outset of this paper, the AEC has been relatively successful in securing job pledges from 
employers. By mid-2010, those commitments had reached over 20,000, prompting one journalist to claim 
that Forrest’s goal ‘of finding jobs for 50,000 Aborigines is almost half complete’ (Koch 2010). This claim 
should be viewed with considerable caution, though, because despite some recent suggestions that the 
original target was for 50,000 job pledges (see Business Council of Australia (BCA) 2010: 27), the publicly 
stated goal was always to ‘secure 50,000 sustainable jobs filled by Indigenous Australians’ (AEC 2008b: 1). 
This means not only securing job places but also the ‘placement of 50,000 Indigenous people into work’ 
(AEC n.d.-a). Looking closely again at Fig. 1, it is clear that the AEC has illustrated the scheme as involving 
not only 50,000 job offers but also 50,000 job acceptances. In addition, it would presumably be very 
unusual for the Commonwealth Government to measure the AEC’s performance based on job placements 
if this did not at all correlate to the scheme’s objectives.
Despite such overstated claims about progress towards the original target, the large number of job pledges 
from employers is a significant achievement of the AEC. It may be contributing to a broader trend towards 
increased corporate investment in Indigenous employment and engagement strategies (BCA 2010). 
In some respects, it also represents a notable shift in the Indigenous employment landscape. That is, by 
(at least informally) guaranteeing a job for suitably job-ready Indigenous participants, it creates a real 
incentive to undertake the required training. As Warren Mundine has argued:
You can educate people as much as you like, but if they’ve got no jobs to go into, as a young 
Aboriginal 10-year-old told me, “Why do we need to be educated if there’s nothing for us, 
there’s no future?” This [the AEC] is going to fill that gap (in Elks & Karvelas 2008).
This feature of the AEC also bodes well for discouraged workers who have previously given up looking 
for work. If a job guarantee attracted these workers back into the labour market, it could prove valuable 
in meeting both the AEC targets and the government’s Closing the Gap goals. Registered users of the 
AEC website can also access a search engine for forecasted jobs that ‘AEC employers expect to become 
available’ over the next 12 months (AEC 2010). Job services providers can use this tool to target training 
to industries or occupations with forecasted demand.
However, there are at least two issues in this aspect of the scheme that need careful consideration. 
The first is that not all of these job pledges have yet translated into available jobs. As noted previously, in 
signing up to the AEC, employers guarantee that a certain number of jobs will be made available for AEC 
participants as vacancies arise in the normal course of business. At the time of writing, the homepage of 
the AEC website notes that there are currently 21,519 job pledges and 2,304 job vacancies39 (AEC n.d.-a). 
This is a little confusing, because the website’s in-built search tool gives the very different figure of 4,598 
jobs currently available Australia wide.40 To confuse matters further, according to the drop-down menu of 
jobs by State, there are only 54 available jobs listed across the country. If a search is actually undertaken, 
though, around 350 job advertisements appear (AEC 2010).41
Yet another figure for available AEC jobs can be found on the Commonwealth Government’s JobSearch 
website, where 77 jobs are tagged as Covenant Jobs (DEEWR 2010b).42 There appears to be little correlation 
between the jobs listed on the AEC and JobSearch sites.
BCA:
Business Council 
of Australia
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The second, and perhaps more important, issue is that it is not clear from the AEC’s published materials 
what happens when a job listed by an employer as a Covenant Job is not filled. It is difficult to believe that 
a vacancy would be reserved for prospective AEC participants in perpetuity, with employers usually hoping 
to fill jobs within a relatively short period. There are precedents, however, for employing organisations 
insisting that an advertised job cannot be filled by a non-Indigenous job-seeker.
For example, clauses under equal opportunity and anti-discrimination legislation in some States allow 
employers to specify that applications for advertised positions are only invited from Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people.43 In contrast to this scenario, jobs listed as so-called Covenant Jobs are not 
exclusively reserved for Indigenous job-seekers.44 When requesting more information about jobs listed on 
the website’s ‘find a job’ search engine, job-seekers are asked to indicate whether they are of Aboriginal or 
Torres Strait Islander descent. If they select ‘no’, the following message appears:
Thank you for making an enquiry regarding this position. The Australian Employment Covenant 
and its services are solely aimed at assisting Australian Indigenous people into work. As you have 
indicated that you are not of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander descent, this employer warmly 
welcomes [you] to apply for this job directly with them. Follow the link below to see the list of 
employers (AEC 2010).
Of course, it makes business sense for employers to accept applications for identified Covenant Jobs from 
job-seekers who are not Indigenous. In this sense, the AEC operates much like a traditional ‘affirmative 
action’ scheme under which all suitable applicants are considered, but if there are two or more applicants 
and one is from the target group, the latter applicant will be preferred. As with affirmative action schemes, 
AEC employers may also consider the applicants’ comparative skills and qualifications, being expected to 
give preference to the applicant from the AEC where these other factors are equal (M. James, pers. comm., 
2 September 2010). As noted previously, this means that the job ‘guarantee’ is only an informal one.
The effect of this arrangement is very significant. It means that unless AEC jobs are quickly filled by 
Indigenous job-seekers upon becoming available, they are likely to be taken by other applicants. While 
that would mean the number of AEC jobs pledged by the employer would not be any closer to being filled 
(and should therefore roll over into some future recruitment period), it also means that the 22,000 jobs 
so far committed under the AEC might not ever translate into this many jobs for Indigenous Australians. 
For this reason, quoting the number of job pledges as evidence of the AEC’s success in improving 
Indigenous employment prospects is quite misleading: the pledges merely set a maximum on the number 
of Indigenous jobs that could be created under the scheme.
How quickly, or how many, Indigenous jobs are actually created through the AEC relies most fundamentally 
not on job pledges but on job placements. For this reason, it is crucial to understand both the types of jobs 
available and the potential barriers to Indigenous participation in the scheme.
INDIGENOUS PARTICIPATION
The key point to note here is that while over 20,000 jobs have been pledged under the AEC, only an 
estimated 2,800 or so have been filled by Indigenous job-seekers. Matthew O’Sullivan (pers. comm., 
27 October 2010) has explained that more accurate data are not yet available because securing verifiable 
information on job commencements from employers has proven problematic. Of course, the early stages 
of this job creation occurred in a period in which many commentators were predicting a deep recession, 
so if the estimate of job placements is accurate it is not an insignificant outcome. A comparison to job 
commencements under some other schemes gives some context. For example, it may be a higher rate of 
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job commencements than under the existing RAP scheme.45 However, it is lower than previously recorded 
rates of job-seeker commencements under CLIEP and STEP. The mismatch with the initial enthusiastic 
aspirations of 50,000 jobs warrants careful investigation.
It is useful to start by briefly returning to the CLIEP and STEP programs. In a 2002 review, DEWR found that 
there had been 8,700 job-seeker commencements under these programs in the previous two years (DEWR 
2003: 34). Interestingly, DEWR also found that only around half of the program places generated through 
CLIEP and STEP had been filled by Indigenous participants. They suggested that one solution might be 
relying more on Indigenous networks and organisations in the recruitment process. They also noted that 
participating employers tended to be those that had already developed Indigenous employment strategies 
or had recent experience of employing Indigenous job-seekers (DEWR 2003: 7).
Continuing this trend, many of the early signatories to the AEC had previously participated in the CLIEP 
program. Some signatories to the AEC have also created their own RAPs, which are voluntary agreements 
in which employers outline initiatives for building ‘positive relationships between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous people’ (Reconciliation Australia n.d.). They often include aspirational goals to increase 
Indigenous employment within the organisation. It is not surprising that the same employers should sign 
up to several programs with similar goals. Nonetheless, one measure of the AEC’s success might be the 
extent to which it has engaged with employers beyond the ambit of these other schemes, particularly 
those new to employing Indigenous job-seekers.
The jobs pledged under the AEC so far are spread across more than 130 employers. These include Andrew 
Forrest’s Fortescue Metals Group as well as ANZ and Rio Tinto, two of the companies Rod Eddington 
is associated with. They also include many other large private sector corporations (such as Linfox, 
Commonwealth Bank, Crown Ltd, Woodside), smaller private companies (Darwin’s Allora Nursery Gardens 
and Battery World), sporting organisations (the Australian Football League), tertiary institutions (Curtin 
University of Technology), non-government organisations (Mission Australia, the Koorie Heritage Trust) 
and governments and publicly funded agencies (Holroyd City Council, Northern Territory Government, 
Australian Federal Police and Indigenous Land Corporation).
In examining the employers participating in the AEC, the first thing to note is that they are spread across 
many industries and both the public and private sectors. This seems to bode well, as participating job-
seekers are given the option to choose the industry in which they would most like to work. Of course, as 
noted above, this is limited to the extent that jobs are actually available when job-seekers are looking for 
work. It may also contribute to some advertised jobs not being filled, where no AEC participants express 
a preference for that industry.
The second point of interest is the location of available jobs. Some of the employers participating in the 
scheme are highly localised. Others—particularly the very large corporations—are able to offer jobs in 
several locations. For example, among the jobs currently listed in the AEC’s ‘find a job’ search engine, 
Linfox (a very large warehousing and transport company) has jobs available in every State and Territory 
(AEC 2010). Overall, the large majority of jobs listed on the site are in New South Wales, Victoria and 
Queensland. While most of the jobs in Victoria are located in Melbourne, the jobs listed in New South 
Wales include a concentration in western Sydney and a number outside the capital in the central coast 
and Tamworth regions. Jobs listed in Queensland include small concentrations in Brisbane’s west and in 
and around Cairns in the far north of the State.
What is interesting here is whether the location of advertised AEC jobs correlates to the location of 
Indigenous job-seekers. This is best captured by the Indigenous unemployment rate, which measures the 
proportion of people in the Indigenous labour force who are actively looking for a job and available 
to start work. DEEWR has stated that the AEC initially included both ‘a broad promotional campaign 
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targeting all Indigenous job-seekers’ and a ‘focus on those locations that are most likely to attract the 
greatest number of Indigenous job-seekers’ (DEEWR 2008: 2). While unemployment data by location are 
limited, it is certainly true that there are high rates of Indigenous unemployment in areas such as western 
Sydney and significant pockets of unemployment in and around some regional centres like Tamworth and 
Cairns (Biddle 2009a; Biddle, Taylor & Yap 2008). To this extent, the location of many of the available AEC 
jobs seems well targeted.
However, there are very few jobs listed in other parts of the country where there are very high concentrations 
of Indigenous unemployed. For example, other than two jobs in Katherine and one in Port Hedland there 
are no identified jobs in the remote parts of the Northern Territory or Western Australia. Asking a resident 
in these remote regions to migrate for a minimum of 26 weeks work may be a very significant barrier to 
participation in this scheme. Nonetheless, it is true that most Indigenous people live in metropolitan and 
regional areas and, for these people, a local AEC employer might be an attractive option. Unfortunately, it 
is not possible to discern from the AEC website whether there are any identified jobs in some other areas 
of high Indigenous unemployment, such as western New South Wales.46
The third point to note in examining the jobs offered under the AEC is occupation. It is here where the 
most telling conclusions can be drawn. For a start, controlling for occupation reveals that the options 
for Indigenous job-seekers are much narrower than a total tally of available jobs suggests. Of the 350 
jobs listed on the ‘find a job’ search engine at the time of writing, almost 90 per cent are with Linfox, 
and most of these are as warehouse pickers and packers in Linfox’s warehouse division (AEC 2010). While 
these may be suitable entry level positions for some people who have otherwise been unable to find work, 
they are likely to be of limited appeal to many job-seekers. Of course, that a particular job is unappealing 
is not necessarily a reason to remain on welfare, but the decision to exit welfare into a low-skilled and 
low-paying job may be a difficult one if there are high income replacement ratios (Daly & Hawke 1994).47 
Moreover, the overwhelming dominance of these positions on the AEC website does highlight a potential 
pitfall of employment schemes where diverse Indigenous interests are not adequately catered for and the 
number of available jobs disguises a much narrower range of occupations.
A further point of interest is that aside from these and similar entry level positions listed on the AEC website 
(such as security officers and food and beverage attendants), several of the jobs listed through the AEC 
require substantial existing skills and qualifications.48 For example, advertisements are listed for a public 
health nutritionist, an emergency medicine specialist, a civil and project engineer and several registered 
nurses. All of these positions require relevant tertiary qualifications and professional experience.
As we identified earlier in this paper, Indigenous underemployment may be a significant problem. To the 
extent that skilled jobs advertised through the AEC allow Indigenous workers to transfer into jobs that 
better utilise their existing skills, they may help to reduce skill-based underemployment. This would be a 
positive outcome. However, it clearly does not fit the stated aim of the AEC in getting Indigenous people 
off welfare (whether unemployed or not in the labour force) and into paid work. Likewise, while a person 
with qualifications and experience as a civil engineer or medical specialist may sometimes experience 
periods of unemployment, they are presumably not the disadvantaged job-seekers at risk of long term 
unemployment and welfare dependency that the AEC ostensibly seeks to target. Moreover, they are 
probably least likely to need assistance under the scheme.
None of this means that highly skilled occupations should not be included in the AEC. What it does mean, 
though, is that not all of the job commitments will be filled by unemployed Indigenous job-seekers. For this 
reason, the number of jobs advertised under the AEC—or even filled by Indigenous people—should not be 
taken as a proxy for the number of Indigenous people assisted off welfare and into paid work. 
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A counterpoint here is that while jobs committed under the scheme are not always reserved exclusively 
for unemployed Indigenous job-seekers, intensive training and assistance are only available to job-seekers 
who are registered with Centrelink (GenerationOne 2010).
In September 2009, Andrew Forrest and Malcolm James launched a new project, GenerationOne (often 
referred to as GenOne). James has described GenOne as ‘an online movement to engage young people in 
the process of improving the lives of Indigenous Australians’ (AEC n.d.-a). Sponsored by the AEC, GenOne’s 
vision is very similar to that of its sponsor: to end Indigenous disadvantage by increasing employment 
participation. Spelled out in more detail, this vision is:
To change the ‘welfare state’ that has destroyed so many Indigenous Australians
To change the aspirations of Indigenous Australians
To change the common perceptions of Indigenous Australians
To change government policy so that every dollar of government spending is directly linked to 
the only sustainable way out of poverty—a REAL JOB (AEC n.d.-a).
Anyone (whether Indigenous or not) can join GenOne, and the organisation encourages its members to 
take an active role in pursuing its vision. This might involve lobbying politicians and supporting Indigenous 
businesses, requesting a mentor, or offering to mentor Indigenous students and workers. Importantly, 
GenOne also encourages its members to participate in the AEC, either by offering or finding a job 
(GenerationOne 2010). While it is not clear whether GenOne had always been envisaged by Forrest as 
an adjunct to the AEC, or whether it was introduced in response to low take-up of available AEC jobs, as 
an online tool that encourages ‘spreading the word’ through social networking it is clearly designed to 
encourage greater engagement with the AEC.
TRAINING COMPLETION RATES AND JOB RETENTION RATES
As noted above, the AEC has committed to recording and publishing outcomes achieved, as measured by 
‘the number of Indigenous participants who complete job-specific training, commence employment with 
an AEC Employer and subsequently remain in full or part-time employment for a minimum of 26 weeks’ 
(AEC 2008b: 2). This highlights a crucial point: that improving Indigenous employment outcomes requires 
not only training commencements and job placements but also training completion and job retention.
In previous research on labour market programs for Indigenous job-seekers, Hunter, Gray and Chapman 
(2000: viii) have examined the relative effectiveness of different types of programs in terms of completion 
and retention rates. Using data from the mid-1990s, they assessed the effectiveness of wage subsidy 
schemes, job creation programs, formal training programs and employment support/placement services.49
The AEC relies on two types of programs identified by Hunter and colleagues: those that provide formal 
training for unemployed job-seekers and those that offer employment support and job placement. 
Importantly, in their review of labour market programs in the 1990s, Hunter, Gray and Chapman (2000: 
xiii, 39) found that these types of programs were less effective for improving participants’ employment 
prospects than wage subsidies. For example, while employment support programs had the highest 
completion rates, wage subsidy programs were associated with longer periods of employment (better 
retention) than any other type of labour market program.50
This finding is perhaps not surprising. While wage subsidy and job creation programs operate to directly 
increase a participant’s employability (by reducing the costs to employers of hiring them), employment 
support/placement services and training programs operate only indirectly by improving a participant’s 
employability upon program completion (Hunter, Gray & Chapman 2000: 13). Moreover, Hunter, Gray and 
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Chapman (2000: 42–43) suggested that the longer retention of wage subsidy participants reflected the 
fact that there were options for their ongoing post-program employment, whereas participants in other 
labour market programs had to enter the open labour market upon program completion. The majority of 
the latter group either returned to unemployment or left the labour force entirely.
A study by DEWR in 2002 confirmed the result that wage subsidy was the most effective Indigenous 
employment program available at that time, with positive results in both participation and retention. 
While providing a more positive overall assessment of the impact of employment programs than Hunter 
and colleagues, DEWR identified a number of problems with existing schemes. These included the need to:
• better target the most disadvantaged job-seekers;
• increase Indigenous recruitment into some programs;
• develop ongoing employer commitment; and
• ensure training was clearly linked to employment rather than offering training ‘for its own 
sake’ (DEWR 2003: 3–7).
In assessing the achievements of the AEC, then, the key issue concerns its ‘value added’ to existing labour 
market programs, particularly those under the IEP. By asking employers to sign a covenant and offer job 
guarantees to Indigenous participants who successfully complete training programs, the AEC is clearly 
seeking to address at least the latter two of DEWR’s concerns. In addition, the job guarantee—and the 
suggestion that participants commit to employment for at least 26 weeks—are no doubt intended to 
better the completion rates of existing training programs and the retention rates achieved by standard 
job services.
Taking these elements in turn, the job guarantee certainly has potential to increase post-training retention 
rates. By creating an incentive to complete the required pre-employment training, it also has the potential 
to increase rates of training completion. The first point is leant some support by initial anecdotal evidence 
from the AEC. Malcolm James (pers. comm., 2 September 2010) has indicated that while not all participants 
have completed the pre-employment training and entered a job, of those who have done so there have 
been high rates of retention in employment at 26 weeks. According to James, these retention rates have 
often been higher than industry standards.
However, the AEC has had the same difficulties in collecting accurate data on job retention as it has for 
data on job placements. The BCA (2010: 27) has recently cited information that retention rates under the 
AEC might be as high as 86 per cent. But Matthew O’Sullivan (pers. comm., 21 September 2010) notes 
that only around 20 per cent of employers who have taken on Indigenous staff under the scheme have 
provided official reports about retention rates. This proportion is too low to make definitive statements 
about the rates overall.
The suggestion that participants commit up front to 26 weeks of work can be interpreted as an incarnation 
of the principles of mutual obligation and personal responsibility increasingly espoused over the last 
15 years. The latter principle—popularised in particular by Noel Pearson—has become a key feature of 
both Labor and Liberal governments’ recent approaches to Indigenous affairs. Captured in the title of the 
Cape York Institute 2007 document ‘From Hand Out to Hand Up’, the emphasis on personal responsibility is 
designed to combat the problems of passivity and community dysfunction that are seen as deriving from 
welfare dependency (Cape York Institute 2007). While the AEC is not a form of welfare, it does embody 
the same principle of requesting commitments from participants in return for inclusion in the scheme.
Debates about the merits of programs emphasising mutual obligation and personal responsibility have 
often been heated, with some commentators suggesting that these approaches emphasise blaming the 
poor for their own predicament and overlook the structural factors contributing to their situation (Altman 
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2006). The evidence of their effectiveness in improving people’s lives is mixed. For example, while no 
formal evaluation of the Cape York Welfare Reform Trials has yet been released, some supporters argue 
that the strong emphasis on personal responsibility is having positive results (Glanville 2009). On the 
other hand, some studies of mutual obligation over the last decade have suggested that it has been 
relatively ineffective at inducing the desired behavioural change in social security recipients. At least one 
study has suggested that rather than pushing the unemployed into work, it has been more common for 
recipients of unemployment benefits to either complete mutual obligation activities but subsequently 
remain unemployed, or transfer onto alternative payments where mutual obligation requirements are less 
restrictive (Lim 2008).
In the case of the AEC—a voluntary program in which participation is not required of all Indigenous welfare 
recipients—it is certainly possible that rather than shoring up job retention, a suggestion that participants 
commit to at least 26 weeks of work may create a disincentive to participate. Entering into a job with a 
new employer and in a new workplace is always a period of uncertainty and, just as employers often assess 
new staff during a trial period, many employees treat their first few weeks on the job as a trial of their 
new circumstances. Committing to a minimum of 26 weeks of work before the participant has even met 
their new employer may be a big ask for anyone, and more so for those with little workplace experience. 
This may be the case even when there are no penalties for failing to complete the agreed period. It may 
also be a particular concern for some Indigenous job-seekers, with research suggesting that Indigenous 
peoples’ cultural and family obligations can contribute to higher rates of temporary mobility (Prout 2008). 
This can, in turn, necessitate more flexible employment options.51
It should be noted that while the AEC initially intended that all participating job-seekers would sign an 
undertaking to stay in employment for 26 weeks, in practice any such requests have been at the discretion 
of employers. Nonetheless, if such requests to agree up front to what is effectively an unusually long trial 
period have been a disincentive to job-seekers, the effectiveness of the program may have been limited 
in at least two ways. Firstly, any incentive created by the job guarantee may at worst have been cancelled 
out. Secondly, the higher retention rate of those who have found jobs through the program may be 
coming at the cost of lower participation rates overall.
While the reported short-term job retention rates achieved by the AEC may appear to be better than 
those of standard labour market programs, a realistic assessment of the effectiveness of the AEC needs 
also to take into account a further two commonly acknowledged concerns. The first can be referred to as 
the substitution effect. This means that in order to understand the effects of the program on actual job 
creation, one must know whether the successful job placement and retention of one individual has come 
at the expense of another (Hunter, Gray & Chapman 2000: 14).
Substitution effects are usually an issue when seeking to understand the macroeconomic effects of labour 
market programs, such as the impact on total employment. However, they are also a key concern in 
understanding the impact of the AEC because, as already noted, many of the employers participating in 
the scheme have also been signatories to CLIEP or developed their own RAPs. Under these programs they 
may have already committed to Indigenous employment targets, so it is impossible to know whether a 
position they have offered under the AEC would have been filled by an Indigenous job-seeker anyway. 
The issue here is not the outcome: increased Indigenous employment can be judged a positive outcome 
regardless of which scheme is responsible. Rather, it is a technical question of isolating the effects of the 
AEC in order to accurately assess its additional contribution.
The second concern is commonly referred to as ‘selection bias.’ This acknowledges the probability that the 
number of job placements a program achieves indicates, at least in part, the self-selection of the least 
disadvantaged job-seekers into job services or placements rather than improved outcomes for those most 
in need (see DEWR 2002: 3; Hunter, Gray & Chapman 2000: x). This may be particularly relevant for the 
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AEC because such self-selection is likely to be amplified if prospective job-seekers are asked to sign a 26-
week work commitment. Presumably, the least confident and experienced job-seekers may find this most 
daunting. Self-selection biases are important in understanding the net effects of employment programs 
because they increase the likelihood that outcomes will be skewed upward by those who may have found 
employment without intensive assistance.
RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT AND TRANSPARENCY OF THE AEC
According to Kevin Rudd, the introduction of the AEC has signaled a major shift in Australia’s approach to 
Indigenous affairs. Arguing that the covenant signified the ‘death of ideology’ because it recognised the 
inability of governments to meet the challenge of Indigenous disadvantage alone, Rudd stated that ‘this is 
no longer a question about can Government fix all these problems … We cannot. Let’s just be honest about 
it, be upfront about it, tell the truth about it’ (Rudd 2008a).
While it is true that the AEC is a private sector initiative sponsored by the state, rather than seeing it as a 
radical break from the past we see it as part of an ongoing trend towards greater private sector involvement 
in what are essentially public employment programs. This shift towards indirect public funding for non-
government delivery of employment services began as early as the 1980s (Hunter, Gray & Chapman 2000: 
4), and since the mid-1990s the delivery of most labour market programs has been contracted out to 
non-government providers on a competitive basis, first under the Job Network and more recently under 
Job Services Australia.
Although the AEC is coordinated under new arrangements, as noted previously it still relies heavily on 
existing programs delivered through DEEWR and the Job Services Australia network. In effect, then, 
the AEC is both a new referral system for the delivery of publicly subsidised employment programs and 
a corollary to existing initiatives that are designed to increase employer demand for Indigenous workers.
Public-private agreements are an increasingly common feature of service delivery, but relations between 
the parties can often be fraught. In early 2009, only four months into the scheme, Andrew Forrest raised 
concerns that the government commitments to training were mired in red tape. Noting that the employing 
organisations needed ‘quick responses’, Noel Pearson suggested they would not wait for bureaucratic 
hurdles to clear and that hundreds of jobs would ‘go begging’ if the training was not delivered when 
employers needed it (ABC News Online 2009).
Soon after suggesting that the government was failing to deliver its end of the bargain, Forrest declared 
that the problem had been rapidly addressed. Indeed, he noted that in response to his concerns the 
government had responded ‘with a speed that I haven’t seen in 30 years’ (Forrest 2009). Such a quick 
response may speak to suggestions of what was perhaps an unusually close relationship between Forrest 
and the Rudd Government, with one newspaper report saying that Rudd had granted the AEC team 
‘full cabinet access’ (Gibson 2008). Nonetheless, with the precise details of the training and funding 
agreements between the AEC and federal government not made public, it is not possible to ascertain from 
public documents whether training bottlenecks have continued and, if so, whether they have contributed 
to a slower than expected rate of job placements.
This raises the more important point of transparency and accountability. The case has long been made 
that public-private partnerships and outsourcing arrangements for the provision of services present real 
problems for accountability in the expenditure of public funds. Critics argue, for example, that funding 
agreements and even assessments of outcomes are often hidden behind commercial-in-confidence 
provisions, and that private providers are not subject to direct enquiry by normal agencies of government 
accountability such as parliamentary committees (Mulgan 2006).
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Public-private partnerships involve some sort of ‘cooperative institutional arrangements between public 
and private sector actors’ (Greve & Hodge 2005: 1). The relevance of critiques of these arrangements to 
the AEC is not complete because, for example, the common concern that private partners in public-private 
partnerships might compromise services in their quest for profit clearly does not apply. In this sense, the 
AEC may be more akin to outsourcing, with its efforts to engage employers in Indigenous employment 
programs seemingly delivering some functions of programs (like CLIEP) that would otherwise be delivered 
by the state. It is not clear, though, that the AEC should be considered a contractor requiring protection in 
relation to any ‘competitors’, so the usual commercial-in-confidence clauses should not necessarily apply.
Nonetheless, many of the criticisms of both public-private partnerships and outsourcing are directly 
relevant to the rather opaque arrangements agreed to by the AEC and federal government. For example, 
while the AEC committed to making employment outcomes public, at the time of writing they have only 
publicised the number of jobs pledged. This makes any public assessment of the effectiveness of the 
scheme—and the efficiency of the government’s associated expenditure—impossible.
Akin to what sometimes transpires in the assessment of outsourcing arrangements, the only information 
about the scheme’s job creation outcomes that has previously been available on the public record 
has been extracted through parliamentary questioning of the associated government department. In 
response to questioning from the Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee (SCALC) in February 
2010, DEEWR identified that, as of 31 January, 622 AEC participants had been placed into jobs (SCALC 
2010a). On 30 April, again in response to questions asked in Senate estimates, DEEWR reported that as 
of 25 February they had a direct record of 121 job commencements under the scheme. At the same time, 
the AEC reported 903 commencements by 28 February (SCALC 2010b).
The variance in these figures likely reflects the difficulties the AEC has faced in collecting data. If we 
accept that the AEC’s February report of 903 commencements and the current estimate of around 2,800 
jobs are both accurate, this suggests a significant improvement in outcomes over the last eight months. 
However, one-off public reporting in response to parliamentary questioning is clearly not sufficient for 
proper assessment. Moreover, it should be clear that the figure of approximately 2,800 jobs is indeed an 
estimate. As noted, the AEC has stated that it does not yet have more accurate data because of difficulties 
in securing information about job placements from employers. The same limitation also means that the 
AEC has inadequate information on job retention. These are important concerns that need to be rectified 
if the AEC is to fulfil its obligations to report on actual employment outcomes.52
Concerns about reporting also extend to information on the number of jobs currently available, with 
several different figures listed online. This may simply be a technical issue with the AEC website, or relate 
to different ways in which ‘available AEC jobs’ are defined for this purpose.53 Either way, it might be less 
important for job-seekers registered with a Job Services Australia provider who would presumably have 
access to a more accurate list. Nonetheless, it is a problem both for prospective participants—who may 
wish to examine available jobs for themselves—and for transparency about how many, and what kind of, 
jobs are on offer.
Clearly, accurate reporting is a necessary feature of accountability and transparency. But accountability 
should also be linked to the specific agreement between parties about their respective obligations (Forrer 
et al. 2010). Beyond the essential data on employment outcomes, additional questions remain. For 
example, what is the precise nature of the funding agreement with government, and how is this tied to 
performance measures? What are the details of the agreements about training delivery? Where have the 
jobs been created? And, given the number of jobs created and rates of retention, has value for money been 
achieved? Matthew O’Sullivan (pers. comm., 27 October 2010) has indicated that because data on job 
placement and retention are not yet available, the AEC has not yet invoiced for these outcomes. However, 
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it has received outcome payments for job pledges. Much more information is needed if we are to assess 
the impact of this public investment, including accurate data on retention rates well beyond the initial 
26-week period, something the AEC has not established procedures to collect.
Making more information public would also be in the broader interests of improving Indigenous peoples’ 
employment prospects. For example, if retention rates at 26 weeks are indeed higher than industry 
averages, what factors have contributed this relative success? Do retention rates remain high beyond this 
period? Has the mentoring and cultural awareness training proved effective? And has the training been 
adequate and appropriate? Such lessons no doubt learnt throughout the AEC’s first two years could be 
more broadly applicable to other employment programs and add to the currently limited information on 
success factors for job placement and retention.
CONCLUSION: THE EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGE REVISITED
Not surprisingly, the initial announcement that the AEC would aim to create 50,000 jobs for Indigenous 
people within two years generated intense media interest. Such an achievement would have completely 
re-written the accepted wisdom about Indigenous employment in this country, where improvements in 
outcomes have most often been gradual and slow. There were immediate critiques of the initiative that 
suggested its ‘extraordinarily ambitious’ jobs target had not been ‘carefully thought through’ (Altman 
2008). At the same time, the optimism of the scheme’s proponents was obvious and, for some, infectious. 
It captured the imagination of employers, government, and Indigenous leaders. For Noel Pearson, for 
example, it ‘was a complete hit to the solar plexus when Andrew proposed not a few thousand real jobs in 
a timeframe, but 50,000 guaranteed real jobs’ (Elks 2008).
Optimism is by no means a fault and is sometimes sorely lacking in Indigenous affairs. Certainly, the 
insistence of Forrest and colleagues that Indigenous Australians can be just as keen and able workers as 
other Australians can not be debated. However, unless the size of the AEC’s original job creation target 
was simply a strategy to secure attention and resources, its dramatic over-estimation of its short-term 
potential does suggest that its proponents overlooked some notable obstacles that should have been quite 
clear. There is long-standing evidence that many Indigenous people face major barriers to employment 
(such as low levels of English literacy, minimal work experience and locational disadvantage) that cannot 
be overcome with short-term pre-employment training. An additional concern is the compatibility of 
certain types of work with Indigenous cultures and aspirations. Indeed, while the AEC has fallen well short 
of its stated goals, perhaps the strongest criticism of the scheme is its tendency to either undervalue or 
overlook the socio-cultural systems of some Indigenous people that may make mainstream work in highly 
regimented jobs particularly problematic.
CURRENT CAPACITIES TO WORK
Substantial research has documented the often immense difficulties of getting disadvantaged job-seekers 
into sustainable employment. For example, as noted earlier it is widely accepted that the long-term 
unemployed face particular challenges and are often overlooked by potential employers (Chapman & 
Kapuscinski 2000). Combined with the loss of workplace skills and associated difficulty in keeping up with 
technological changes, this means that without effective intervention, long spells of unemployment can 
in effect become self-perpetuating.
Such problems may be exacerbated for some Indigenous Australians who face particular structural 
disadvantages. These include, for example, a history of marginalisation and exclusion from mainstream 
institutions until relatively recently. They also include the under-resourcing of Indigenous education and 
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other services that has contributed to low levels of English literacy and high rates of morbidity over 
many decades (Altman 2006). While the causes of Indigenous educational disadvantage are complex 
(Kral 2009), it is well established that Indigenous people fare worse, on average, than other Australians on 
levels of educational attainment, and that this can create very real barriers to participation in mainstream 
employment (Hunter 1996; SCRGSP 2009: 4.32–4.57).
For example, lower average skill levels and formal education may mean that many Indigenous people 
have fewer of the ‘human capital’ endowments favoured by most employers (Biddle, Taylor & Yap 2008). 
For some Indigenous people, limited English literacy and numeracy and the lack of experience in holding 
a regular job can put employment even in low-skilled occupations out of reach.54 Moreover, the effects of 
socioeconomic disadvantage on employment often play out over time, so that, for example, educational 
disadvantage early in life can lead to chronic and enduring deficiencies in human capital throughout the 
lifecycle (Biddle, Taylor & Yap 2008). In this way disadvantages can become both multidimensional and 
intergenerational. This was no doubt recognised by former Australian of the Year Mick Dodson, who stated 
in 2009 that adult literacy was the key to closing the gap in life expectancy between Indigenous and other 
Australians (Kral 2009: 1).
A key concern, then, is whether the short-term pre-employment training offered under the AEC is 
sufficient for the needs of the disadvantaged Indigenous job-seekers the program ostensibly seeks to 
assist. Boyd Hunter (2009: 9), for example, has questioned whether ‘the deep skill deficits’ among those 
Indigenous people who have been most disadvantaged by ‘a long history of educational neglect’ can be 
overcome by short training courses. The evidence to date suggests, not surprisingly, that it cannot.
While the Covenant team have commendable faith in their capacity to assist the most disadvantaged 
Indigenous job-seekers, Malcolm James (pers. comm., 2 September 2010) does acknowledge the challenges 
the initiative faces. For example, by his estimation, some 90 per cent of Indigenous job-seekers have ‘some 
or severe’ barriers to employment. According to James, that means while it may be relatively simple to teach 
people new skills, it is much more difficult to develop their capacity to work (which necessitates things 
like turning up to work each day—something the very long-term or intergenerationally unemployed might 
have little experience of). For that reason, James argues that capacity building is the key to addressing 
Indigenous employment disadvantage.
Recognition of some of the complex factors contributing to poor Indigenous employment outcomes is 
a positive sign and seems a sensible counterbalance to much of the AEC’s public rhetoric. The identified 
solution—the longer-term development of basic work capacities among Indigenous people facing particular 
disadvantages—is by no means new. Indeed, while the effectiveness of the Work for the Dole program has 
been debated, the development of work readiness among the unemployed has been a prominent argument 
for it (Carson et al. 2003).
Presumably a lack of work capacity is something the AEC seeks to address through its P Plate program. 
However, while it is no doubt a legitimate concern, there may be a fine line between lack of work ‘capacity’ 
and valid cultural considerations, necessitating creative responses if employment outcomes are to be 
substantially improved. As the next section argues, if ‘capacity’ is taken to mean ‘work ready’ in a highly 
regimented Western sense, there are strong arguments that such ‘capacity building’ might be antithetical 
to some Indigenous interests.
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CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Since as early as the 1960s, commentators have suggested that one of the obstacles to higher rates of 
Indigenous employment participation is cultural differences in Indigenous peoples’ attitudes and aspirations 
to paid work. For example, Smith (1991: 21) has summarised the view of Coombs and others that:
what constitutes work for some Aboriginal people is based on values and behaviours 
fundamentally at odds with western notions of the wage contract, hierarchical employment 
structures and participation in the labour force.
In explaining this position, Coombs argued that:
Aborigines do not face the general Australian economy with their time fully available for 
employment or divided simply between ‘work’ and ‘leisure’. Rather they come with their 
time significantly allocated to distinctly Aboriginal purposes and activities. Employment or 
involvement in the Australian economy involves a trade-off between the potential to earn cash 
and a range of other activities (in Smith 1991: 21).
Several more recent studies have reached similar conclusions to Coombs. Gibson (2006), Austin-Broos 
(2006) and Tonkinson (2007) have all conducted ethnographic research that identifies cultural attitudes to 
work among some Indigenous Australians that are incompatible with mainstream Western work practices. 
One example is where the maintenance of important family relationships and cultural obligations is 
considered the real work of day-to-day life and is more important in conferring social status, esteem and 
meaning than a regular paid job.
This may have important implications when, for example, obligations to attend family events or cultural 
ceremonies take precedence over work commitments. Some commentators might see this as an Aboriginal 
‘problem’ and suggest ‘re-education’ into the discipline of a full-time and regular job. Even if this kind of 
approach is deemed warranted, it must be acknowledged that any changes are likely to be slow and require 
more intensive investment than short-term pre-employment training or 26 weeks of post-employment 
mentoring. It is useful here to reflect on the much longer inculcation of the value of paid work in Western 
societies, with the notion that paid employment is a ‘rational’ use of our a time a product of particular 
historical circumstances (Edgell 2006; Giorgi & Marsh 1990). As Kral (2010: 1) has recently noted, for 
some Indigenous people the ‘normative logic’ of a sequenced pathway involving the individual pursuit 
of educational credentials and subsequent entry into paid employment is a notion introduced only in 
very recent generations. It is far removed from the much more longstanding adherence to socio-cultural 
systems in which value and meaning derive from kin-based obligations and cultural knowledge, that 
continue to bear strong resonance for some Indigenous people today.
Moreover, it must also be noted that with any efforts to force change in Indigenous cultures, there 
may be trade-offs in terms of the loss of highly valued socio-cultural forms and social cohesion. There 
might also be real tensions for some Indigenous people whose identity and sense of purpose are much 
more closely attached to their cultural obligations than their participation in paid work (Altman & Rowse 
2005). This does not suggest that Indigenous cultures are static and inflexible. Indeed, Indigenous people 
are often highly inter-cultural, adapting to and acting on contemporary environments by synthesising 
existing cultural knowledges and a multiplicity of other influences (Kral 2010: 10). It is also true that many 
Indigenous people, even in very remote areas, do have a strong desire for culturally appropriate work.
However, concerns about Indigenous aspirations acknowledge that Indigenous cultures and priorities have 
intrinsic value irrespective of their compatibility with notions of regimented work. They also problematise 
elements of the AEC rhetoric that cast paid employment as the ‘correct choice’ (AEC n.d.-a) and raise 
questions over Forrest’s comments that seem to at best conflate alternative cultural schemas with 
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‘unhelpful habits’ (Forrest, in AEC n.d.-b: 3). The second objective of GenOne—to ‘change the aspirations 
of Indigenous Australians’—suggests a similar oversimplification that fails to recognise either the value of 
Indigenous cultural preferences or the current desire of many Indigenous people to work.
There is still inadequate research about Indigenous peoples’ aspirations and attitudes to paid employment, 
particularly among those living in urban or regional areas. In these locations cultural obligations are often 
no less important than elsewhere, but attitudes to work may well be quite different to what Coombs and 
others have described. However, even in urban areas there may be notable cultural barriers to employment 
participation (see, for example, Gibson 2006). These might include the flexibility of working hours, the 
cultural fit of a job, and the ability to engage in cultural obligations which may involve strong attachments 
to particular locations and/or regular short-term mobility.
The messages given by the AEC about the extent to which these concerns should be accommodated in 
employment have been very mixed. For example, Forrest has made the sweeping statement that 85 per 
cent of Indigenous Australians live ‘within 15 minutes walk of a job’ (Gibson 2008). He includes in this 
figure Aboriginal people living near mining leases, presumably including those in remote regions. Although 
it is subject to data limitations, recent research does suggest that shortfalls in ‘human capital’ might be 
more significant than locational constraints in explaining low rates of Indigenous employment overall55 
(Biddle 2009b). However, Forrest’s statement is no doubt an over-estimate and could be interpreted as 
trivialising the rational commitment of many remote-living Indigenous people to remain on their own land 
even when robust labour markets are lacking.
In addition, while the AEC has placed considerable emphasis on the need for appropriate mentoring and 
cultural awareness training, there have also been mixed messages about the extent to which an individual’s 
cultural obligations should be taken into account by employers. The AEC’s guide for mentors—the ‘Heroes 
Handbook’—notes that ‘some new employees may need help to balance their commitments to work, 
family and community’ (AEC n.d.-b: 4). It also notes that ‘low life expectancy can increase the number 
of funerals a person is expected to attend’, and encourages mentors to ‘be mindful of the impacts of 
Indigenous culture and community’ (AEC n.d.-b: 5, 7).
However, Warren Mundine has said that under the AEC Indigenous people should be treated no differently 
to other workers. For example, he argues that if they have ‘sorry business’, they should only have access to 
the regular bereavement and annual leave also available to their non-Indigenous colleagues (Gibson 2008). 
There is great potential in this arrangement for Indigenous peoples’ cultural obligations to be compromised. 
Outside of the AEC scheme, this concern has been recognised by some employing organisations that have 
introduced additional (albeit usually limited) cultural or ceremonial leave for Indigenous employees.
Wesley Aird (2009), formerly a member of the AEC team, has reiterated Mundine’s views that Indigenous 
people should ‘live by the same obligations and social contract as the rest of the country’. Moreover, 
he has rejected the alternate argument, characterising it as suggesting that ‘something in our culture 
means that we do not have to work.’ In fact, the alternative position is not always so extreme. Additional 
ceremonial leave, flexible work hours or other strategies negotiated on a case-by-case basis can provide 
avenues to accommodate particular Indigenous cultural concerns in mainstream workplace practices.
The cultural fit of a workplace is not limited to mentoring support for individual staff. A key concern is 
the absence of workplace discrimination. Here, institutional discrimination may include the inability of 
employers to understand or accommodate the particular cultural needs of their staff. As noted previously, 
AEC employers sign an agreement to ensure their workplace practices and terms of employment ‘are 
non-discriminatory of Indigenous employees’ (AEC 2008c: 1). There is very little research (as opposed to 
anecdotal evidence) about the extent of workplace discrimination—whether personal or institutional—
experienced by Indigenous workers. Most of the few available studies on employment discrimination 
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towards Indigenous people have focused on its potential as a barrier to employment, rather than Indigenous 
workers’ post-employment experiences (see Booth, Leigh & Varganova 2010; Hunter 2005). However, at 
least one qualitative study has drawn on Indigenous employees’ own experiences of prejudice and found 
that discrimination in the workplace is an important concern (Mellor 2003).
In terms of assessing the AEC’s outcomes in this area, a key issue here is whether AEC employers are 
required to report on their efforts to ensure workplace practices and cultures are non-discriminatory. It is 
interesting, for example, that most affirmative action schemes require organisations to report regularly 
on actions taken to address any systemic discrimination. Companies committing to RAPs must also report 
publicly on actions taken and results achieved each year, including any agreements to introduce cultural 
awareness training or improve organisational culture.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Of the many issues we have raised in this paper, chief among them are the possible reasons for the AEC 
falling so far short of its original stated target of 50,000 jobs. These may include structural factors within 
the scheme itself—such as suggestions that participants sign up to a minimum 26 weeks of work before 
they have had any exposure to the workplace—as well as the type, location and availability of Covenant 
Jobs. However, more fundamental concerns include the socioeconomic disadvantages of many Indigenous 
job-seekers who are likely to need more intensive and long-term assistance than is currently standard under 
the IEP. There is also a real potential for cultural dissonance for those Indigenous people whose socio-
cultural experience is at odds with the regimented and relatively inflexible cultures of many workplaces.
The AEC’s representation of paid work as the ‘correct choice’—and the personal barriers to work as ‘old 
and unhelpful habits’—may be well-intentioned, and there is no doubt that such unhelpful habits do 
exist. But such unqualified statements seem to discount alternative and legitimate value preferences 
and may ultimately detract from the pursuit of better Indigenous employment outcomes. In particular, if 
Indigenous labour supply rather than employer demand is the key to improving employment outcomes, 
then it stands to reason that the diversity of Indigenous peoples’ attitudes to work need to be taken into 
account in the design of Indigenous employment programs. This is not an argument against increased 
Indigenous participation in paid work. Rather, it is an argument for thinking more creatively about how 
to engage Indigenous job-seekers in employment schemes through participatory planning and efforts 
to understand and facilitate the kinds of work that match Indigenous preferences and aspirations. It is 
perhaps instructive to note the federal government’s view that the recent changes to the IEP have made 
it more flexible and responsive to the needs of employers (DEEWR n.d.-a). It may be particularly fruitful 
to engender the same flexibility for accommodating the needs and aspirations of Indigenous job-seekers, 
ostensibly the clientele the IEP is designed to assist.
An additional concern of this paper has been the question of accountability and the efficiency of 
government expenditure on the AEC. There is no doubt that increasing employer demand is commendable, 
and the AEC will publish its achievements in job placement numbers and retention rates in due course. 
Even the estimated 2,800 jobs is a positive outcome if retention rates are indeed high. But key questions—
as yet unanswered—include the ‘value added’ of the program and the ‘value for money’ of the public 
investment. On the criteria of the AEC’s own ‘sister organisation’, GenerationOne, we should be asking 
questions here: one goal of that scheme is ‘to change government policy so that every dollar of government 
spending is directly linked to the only sustainable way out of poverty—a REAL JOB’ (AEC n.d.-a).
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Unless more detailed information is released about the AEC’s outcomes and, crucially, its agreements 
with government, it is not possible to assess how well taxpayer dollars are translating into sustainable 
jobs under this initiative. As the AEC progresses it will continue to engender strong feelings, whether of 
skepticism or support. But after two years greater public disclosure about the program—not only the 
challenges it has faced but also its achievements and lessons learnt—is in all our interests.
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NOTES
1. The AEC have so far been unable to determine an exact figure, but their estimate is that the actual 
number of jobs filled is around 2,800 (M. O’Sullivan, pers. comm., 27 October 2010).
2. On 20 February 2009 Andrew Forrest stated at a doorstop interview that the two-year timeframe 
had been taken off the scheme ‘a long time ago’ (Forrest 2009). In September that same year he 
wrote in a letter to Jon Altman—then director of CAEPR—that the AEC was ‘a joint initiative with 
the Australian Government working to employ fifty thousand Indigenous Australians in sustainable 
employment within two years.’ Reiterating the two-year timeframe may have been an error, but 
these conflicting statements are quite confusing. To further confuse matters, a recent story in The 
Australian newspaper reported that ‘the AEC aims to place 50,000 Indigenous people into sustainable 
jobs by June next year’ (Warne-Smith 2010).
3. These data have not been adjusted to attempt to correct for census undercount and the influence of 
non-demographic factors on the intercensal change in Indigenous population counts. See note 13.
4. Under the Coalition’s plan the AEC would have been extended to non-Indigenous job-seekers who 
had been out of work for 12 months or more.
5. Unemployment rates refer to the proportion of the labour force that is unemployed, where the 
labour force includes those who are either employed or actively looking for a job and available to 
start work.
6. Additional ABS publications provide alternative data sets that can be useful in estimating change in 
key indicators between census collections. These include the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Social Survey and National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Survey. Like the LFS, 
both rely on population samples and are therefore susceptible to sampling error.
7. Measuring and reporting on progress towards closing the gaps also requires setting trajectories for 
the expected outcomes throughout the relevant period. The COAG Reform Council has recently noted 
that these trajectories have not yet been determined (COAG Reform Council 2010). This was the 
subject of a recent discussion in senate estimates, where concern was raised that 20 per cent of the 
time allotted to reach key Closing the Gap targets (that is, two years out of ten) had passed and the 
trajectories needed to plot progress against them were still unclear. Staff from the Commonwealth 
Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs committed to releasing 
such trajectories by September 2010 (Commonwealth of Australia 2010a). 
8. Undercount is influenced by survey methodology and non-responses. It not only reduces the reliability 
of the data produced in each census, but—along with the influence of non-demographic factors 
(such as increased identification as Indigenous) on the intercensal change in Indigenous population 
counts—also makes assessing the change in employment and unemployment levels between censuses 
problematic (Biddle, Taylor & Yap 2008).
9. ‘Adult’ here refers to people aged 15 years and over. The survey of 3,100 Indigenous Australians in 
2009 translated into a sample size of 10,500 records because most respondents were interviewed 
more than once. Records were weighted for population projections based on the 2006 Census 
(ABS 2010).
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10. However, where interviewers conducting the LFS encounter ‘significant cultural, language or 
operational difficulties in remote areas’, they may opt to use a shorter survey form that collects less 
detailed data (ABS 2010).
11. The LFS sample is more ‘clustered’ in remote than non-remote areas, with the effect that most remote-
living Indigenous people in the sample are clustered in only a relatively small number of places. This 
may have important implications for the Indigenous estimates produced from the survey data. For 
example, if the sample moves from a community where there are strong employment opportunities 
to one with fewer job prospects, or vice versa, this may produce a large statistical fluctuation in 
estimates of remote Indigenous labour force status over time (ABS 2010). The ABS also notes that 
remote communities are among the most difficult to enumerate in the census. While this problem is 
minimised through the use of face-to-face interviews and the special Interviewer Household Form in 
nominated discrete Indigenous communities (rather than the standard self-enumeration surveys that 
are used for most households), some effects on data quality remain (ABS 2006).
12. For example, since Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations have very different age structures 
and LFS data are not age-standardised, a direct comparison of results can present a misleading 
picture of differences between the two groups (ABS 2010).
13. Biddle, Taylor and Yap (2008) have attempted to adjust for net undercount in the census by applying 
the census labour force participation rates to the ABS’s experimental estimates of the Indigenous 
working-age population. This method revises the 2006 Census count of Indigenous workers upward 
from 122,000 to 149,000, and likewise revises the increase in Indigenous employment in the five 
years to 2006 up from 22,000 to 29,000. In that sense it presents a more positive picture of 
employment outcomes over the period. Of course, though, the method also revises up the Indigenous 
unemployment level, from 23,000 to around 27,000, and the unemployment rate remains unchanged 
(see Biddle, Taylor & Yap 2008: 6-8). Estimates that attempt to adjust for census undercount are 
not available for all the data used in this paper so, unless otherwise stated, the data presented are 
unadjusted. It should also be noted that because the census undercount is particularly apparent for 
remote areas, and these areas may have quite different employment profiles than other regions, 
attempting to correct for undercount by using ABS population estimates and census rates may 
perpetuate some inaccuracies in the data.
14. Working age is defined as those aged 15–64 years.
15. The relevant standard errors are available at ABS 2010: 52, 60.
16. The percentages in this paragraph have been age standardised. That is, the different age structures of 
the Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations have been taken into account (see SCRGSP 2009). 
17. For example, while some will find long-term jobs, others will ‘churn’ between periods of long- and 
short-term unemployment, non-participation in the labour force and short-term jobs. Still others will 
remain unemployed for very long periods (Dockery & Webster 2001). 
18. Note, though, that some studies suggest that increased duration of unemployment beyond a certain 
length of time corresponds to a levelling off, or even slight improvement, in some aspects of social 
and psychological wellbeing as people better adapt to their circumstances (see Muller et al. 1996).
19. Definitions of underemployment may also include people who are unemployed or only intermittently 
employed; discouraged workers; and even the working poor (see for example Clogg, Sullivan & 
Mutchler 1986; Prause & Dooley 1997). 
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20. For census purposes part-time employment refers to employment for less than 35 hours per week, so 
it also includes casual workers.
21. While different methodologies mean these data should be compared with caution, the magnitude 
of the difference between the reported Indigenous and non-Indigenous rates does suggest that a 
significant disparity existed in practice. 
22. One local case study of a CDEP scheme has also shown that part-time workers wanted to work more 
hours because they were bored on their days off (Gray & Thacker 2001). 
23. The question of how changes to CDEP interact with the AEC’s jobs target is also an important one. 
There may have been some hope that people transitioned out of CDEP work as a result of government 
policies would be subsequently employed under the AEC. Such an outcome would have been ‘neat’ 
because if the 19,000 or so CDEP participants in 2008 (SCRGSP 2009: 4.69) were added to the 23,000 
unemployed, the available cohort would be close to 50,000. However, with only around 2,800 AEC 
jobs filled so far, it is clear that any employment of former CDEP participants under the scheme has 
been limited.
24. Data on the proportion of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people of working age receiving the 
disability support pension are derived from administrative data in which Indigenous identification is 
voluntary. Where an individual’s Indigenous status is not known they are included as non-Indigenous 
(SCRGSP 2009). 
25. In an international context, the definition of ‘discouraged workers’ is often limited to those who want 
to work, are available to do so and are not looking for work because they believe they will not find a 
job (see also ABS 2007; Hunter & Gray 2001). That is, the reason for lack of job search activity is seen 
as a defining feature of discouraged workers. In ABS publications, discouraged workers are defined 
as those who ‘want to work and could start work within four weeks if offered a job, but who have 
given up looking for work for reasons associated with the labour market,’ and where specific reasons 
for lack of job search are any of the following: considered to be too young or too old by employers; 
difficulties with language or ethnic background; no jobs in their locality or line of work; no jobs 
available at all (ABS 2007). This means there are some notable differences with Hunter and Gray’s 
(2001) definition of discouraged workers. For example, Hunter and Gray include those not looking 
for work mainly because of childcare and other family responsibilities. The ABS excludes people who 
could start work within four weeks from the end of the reference week if child care was available 
(ABS 2007). It should be noted that, in practice, it is often very difficult to separate out a person’s 
belief they will not find work from other personal motivations (see Hunter & Gray 2001).
26. Data for Indigenous Australians was drawn from the Indigenous Job Seeker Survey (IJSS) and data 
for other Australians was drawn from the Survey of Employment and Unemployment Patterns (Gray 
& Hunter 2005). It should be noted that the sample recruited for the IJSS was not representative 
of Indigenous job-seekers as a whole. It included around 2,500 participants in selected urban, 
regional and remote centres but excluded job-seekers who were not within reasonable commute 
of a mainstream labour market (that is, whose employment options were limited to participation 
in the CDEP scheme). The sampling methodology also meant that the long-term unemployed were 
disproportionately represented among participants (Hunter, Gray & Jones 2000). See Gray and 
Hunter (2005) for a discussion of the comparability of the two surveys.
27. The 1994 NATSIS.
IJSS:
Indigenous Job 
Seeker Survey
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28. The ABS does include questions about the desire to work (and reasons for lack of job search) among 
those not in the labour force as an annual supplement to its monthly LFS. However, the supplement 
excludes people living in remote and sparsely settled areas (ABS 2009), and the small sample size 
means that estimates are not produced for the Indigenous population.
29. In addition, the intensification of mutual obligation requirements for recipients of unemployment 
benefits from the late 1990s, the more recent tightening of eligibility requirements for the disability 
support pension and parenting payment, and the introduction of income management may have 
encouraged some discouraged workers to commence job search. For example, there is some evidence 
that early mutual obligation requirements increased the probability of exit from unemployment 
benefits (Richardson 2002), although it is not clear if those exiting these payments moved into jobs, 
onto other forms of income support, or outside the labour force.
30. Indeed, while the labour force participation rate of Indigenous Australians increased in the five years 
to 2006, the number of Indigenous people not in the labour force also rose (SCRGSP 2009).
31. Andrew Forrest has explained this terminology by telling mentors that they ‘are the real heroes in this 
story—not the CEOs, not the shareholders but you’ (AEC n.d.-b: 3).
32. Malcolm James has indicated that while background work on developing this scheme has begun, it 
will not be fully operational until 2011 (M. James, pers. comm., 2 September 2010).
33. For example, one of the first business owners to offer jobs under the scheme was Forrest’s long-
standing friend James Packer. 
34. For example, when early concerns were raised that the government was not meeting its commitments 
to provide training under the AEC, Andrew Forrest and Warren Mundine complained that the 
government’s approach to training delivery had become ‘tired’ and was ill-suited to industry’s needs 
(Karvelas 2009).
35. When seeking assistance under the IEP employers can also tick a box on the application form that 
indicates they are participating in the AEC. The AEC states that this is designed to demonstrate 
commitment rather than secure any preferential treatment.
36. Available at <http://jobsearch.gov.au/default.aspx>, accessed 17 August 2010. 
37. Prospective mentors can register with the AEC even if their employer is not a signatory to the 
program, so that ‘when the need arises’ the AEC can call on them to mentor within an organisation 
similar to their own (AEC 2010: unpaginated).
38. The AEC has determined that to make the program efficient, at least in its early stages participating 
schools should have a student population that is at least around 10 per cent Indigenous, or have a 
minimum quantum of 50 Indigenous students (M. James, pers. comm., 2 September 2010).
39. The homepage of the AEC’s website shows a ‘counter’ that lists the number of jobs pledged and 
current vacancies. See <http://www.fiftythousandjobs.com.au/>.
40. When ‘Australia wide’ is selected in the drop-down menu, however, the page states that there are 
4,302 jobs available (AEC 2010).
41. For some of these the closing date for applications had passed. 
42. All of these are in New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia.
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43. Like the ‘special measures’ provisions in the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, State legislation can 
also allow discrimination under certain circumstances. For example, section 65 of South Australia’s 
Equal Opportunity Act 1984 allows discrimination in projects that are for the ‘benefit of persons 
of a particular race’. Section 14 of the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 means that 
employers can discriminate on the basis of ethnicity in making employment decisions where ethnicity 
can be seen as a legitimate occupational qualification. These, and similar, pieces of legislation are 
available at <http://www.austlii.edu.au/>, viewed 19 September 2010.
44. Of course, employers participating in the AEC may specify their own restrictions that mean they will 
only accept applications from Indigenous people, where allowed under anti-discrimination and equal 
opportunity legislation.
45. Gibson (2008) has reported that more than 1,700 jobs were created by RAPs in two years.
46. It is possible to search for jobs according to region (such as western New South Wales or the Hunter), 
but the same jobs come up under each of these regions and the actual location of the workplace is 
not identified. Matthew O’Sulivan (pers. comm., 27 October 2010) has indicated that the AEC will 
soon have data available on the location of jobs filled under the scheme so far.
47. Income replacement ratio in this context refers to the ratio of welfare benefits an individual receives 
to their potential employment income if they exited welfare for paid work.
48. Jobs we are considering ‘entry level’ may also require existing qualifications such as forklift licences 
and Certificate III or IV qualifications.
49. Wage subsidy schemes provide employers with temporary subsidies to offset the wage costs of hiring 
a worker from the target group, while job creation programs go further by providing full funding 
for the wages and material costs of participants. Formal training programs may include training 
subsidies under which part or all of the training costs are publicly funded, and employment services 
and placement schemes provide things like mentoring for job-seekers, assistance with job search 
and matching services to link job-seekers to potential employers. Of course, many labour market 
programs have combined elements of several of these approaches, such as wage subsidy or job 
creation programs that also provide formal training (Hunter, Gray & Chapman 2000: 6-7).
50. It should be noted that Hunter and colleagues’ analysis has some data limitations. It is based on 
longitudinal data collected by the then Commonwealth Department of Employment, Workplace 
Relations and Small Business but is not representative of all Indigenous job-seekers and only 
relates to a short time period. In addition, there is a possibility of selection bias because the least 
disadvantaged job-seekers were the most likely to be supported by wage subsidies (Hunter, Gray & 
Chapman 2000: xi, 62).
51. Similar conclusions have also been drawn about pre-employment training. For example, in their 
review of labour market programs in the 1990s, Hunter and colleagues found that completion rates 
for training programs decreased with the length of the training. They suggested that the tendency 
toward greater geographic mobility among Indigenous people could explain the lower completion 
rate in long training courses, and that better results might be achieved by breaking long courses 
down into a series of shorter components (Hunter, Gray & Chapman 2000: xii, xv).
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52. In late September Matthew O’Sullivan indicated that work was underway to address these concerns 
and the problems should be resolved by late October (M. O’Sullivan, pers. comm., 21 September 2010). 
In late October he indicated that DEEWR is now assisting the AEC to collect accurate data that should 
be available in coming days or weeks (M. O’Sullivan, pers. comm., 27 October 2010).
53. For example, it seems that the highest figure for ‘available jobs’ listed on the AEC job-search engine 
(4,598) includes not only jobs listed as Covenant Jobs, but also other available jobs with AEC employers 
(AEC 2010).
54. Note, though, that for Indigenous youth in remote regions, formal education is only one pathway 
for employment and economic productivity. For example, Kral (2010) has recently noted the 
development of technological skills among young Indigenous adults in several remote locations 
through community-based learning with digital media. Employment opportunities have opened up 
for some of these young people to use these skills in cultural centres, music and media production 
and archival work.
55. It should be noted, though, that this study included CDEP employment, which would have masked the 
‘underlying spatial mismatch’ of non-CDEP jobs (Biddle 2009b: 26). 
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APPENDIX A
DATA QUALITY
In reporting Indigenous labour force status, the choice of data set has significant implications. Table A1 
gives a clear example, comparing figures for Indigenous employment and unemployment from the Census 
and LFS in 2006. The table shows a large discrepancy in employment numbers, with the LFS estimating 
that 40,200 more Indigenous people were in paid work than were counted in the census. The LFS also 
estimated a larger number of Indigenous unemployed (with 3,700 more in this category) and a lower 
unemployment rate.
Employed 
’000
Unemployed 
’000
Unemployment rate 
%
Census 122.3 22.5 15.5
LFS 162.5 26.2 13.9
Source: ABS 2010: 27.
Table A1. Comparison of labour force status data, Census and Labour Force 
Survey, Indigenous persons aged 15 years and over, 2006
Year
Employed Unemployed Not in labour force Unemployment rate
Employment to 
population ratio
Estimate 
(‘000)
SE 
(‘000)
Estimate 
(‘000)
SE 
(‘000)
Estimate 
(‘000)
SE 
(‘000)
Estimate 
(%)
SE 
(pts)
Estimate 
(%)
SE 
(pts)
2006 162.5 6.7 26.2 1.4 134.0 6.6 13.9 0.8 50.4 2.1
2007 160.8 5.4 25.7 1.8 146.4 5.4 13.8 1.0 48.3 1.6
2008 163.2 5.8 27.1 2.1 153.1 5.5 14.2 1.2 47.5 1.7
2009 161.2 8.8 35.4 3.6 157.4 8.0 18.0 2.0 45.5 2.5
Note:  SE = standard errors.
Source: ABS 2010: 27, 45.
Table A2. LFS estimates and standard errors for Indigenous persons aged 15 years and over, 
selected years
Indigenous estimates in the LFS have significant standard errors, due largely to the relatively small sample 
size, and may not be reliable for remote areas. The standard errors relevant to the data in the preceding 
table, and for the data referred to in the article, are shown in Table A2.
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